Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-94-004 *6 January 1994*

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Bosnia-Croatia Talks Conclude in Vienna

Mediators Comment on 4 Jan Talks

AU0501130094 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1100 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Report by Elisa Wasch on statements by UN and EU mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord David Owen in Vienna on 5 January; statements are in English with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Wasch] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Silajdzic and Croatian Foreign Minister Granic assessed yesterday's talks in Vienna positively. They agreed to the return of the Muslims driven away from Mostar by the Croats. But the tough problems—the controversial territorial issues—will be discussed today. UN mediator Stoltenberg and European Union [EU] mediator Lord Owen commented on the negotiations this morning after a meeting with Austria's Foreign Minister Mock.

Before today's talks, hopes for a peaceful solution for Bosnia were very slim. In fact, both the Croatian and the Bosnian representatives described yesterday's talks as constructive, but a solution has been in sight too often in the past before the talks eventually failed. But UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg assessed today's talks positively.

[Stoltenberg] Well, I am always optimistic. If I were not optimistic, I could not survive in this job.

[Wasch] His partner in the marathon talks, EU negotiator Lord Owen, is commenting on the negotiations of the warring parties with increasingly sharp words.

[Owen] I am afraid we have to tell you that there is a big difference between the decisions adopted during negotiations and the actual situation in Bosnia Herzegovina. The fighting is continuing there. The Muslims are continuing to send troops to central Bosnia, and the Croats are continuing to send troops to Herceg-Bosna. Unfortunately, we see no signs of an end to the war. Quite the contrary; the Muslims are trying to capture more villages in central Bosnia—Busovaca and Vitez, for example.

[Wasch] Yesterday the delegations from Zagreb and Sarajevo agreed to organize the return of refugees who left Mostar. The Muslims driven away from there should be allowed to return. Yet, according to Lord Owen, this is only wishful thinking because there is war in Mostar, the Croatian [as heard] capital of Herzegovina.

[Owen] I cannot see how on earth you can possibly hope to get people back to Mostar if the war continues there, even though there may be sporadic cease-fires.

[Wasch] Only if Mostar is placed under EU control, as planned, would the repatriation program stand a chance, Owen stated. Territorial issues will be discussed at today's talks in Vienna. Access to the Adriatic Sea for the Muslims and a cease-fire for embattled central Bosnia will be the major topics. It would be a miracle if agreement were achieved on these issues, and if it were implemented. Negotiations are scheduled to end at noon.

Joint Statement Described

LD0501160294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] A joint statement was issued and a meeting between President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic was announced in Vienna at the talks between the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina delegations headed by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Jozo Curic reports from Vienna.

[Curic] Minister Granic and Prime Minister Silajdzic are holding talks with cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg. At around 1300 the two delegations ended this round of talks, which was held in preparation for the Geneva conference scheduled for 18 January. Both sides accepted a peaceful political resolution of the crisis. The talks were constructive despite a difficult situation on the ground. Both sides acknowledged the situation and the danger of a wider escalation of the conflict. Croatia firmly insists on Neum and is against [granting the Muslims] access to the sea near Prevlaka, which the cochairmen proposed.

A joint statement was coordinated and issued. Both sides confirmed that an urgent cease-fire, a permanent cessation of hostilities, and a permanent normalization of relations between the Croat and Bosniak peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including territorial, political, humanitarian, and other aspects of a permanent resolution, were in the long-term and strategic interest of both peoples and the two states. In light of this, it was agreed that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and President of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic should meet in Bonn on 8 January 1994.

Special attention at the talks was devoted to the need to fully and consistently respect previous cease-fire agreements, particularly because of the situation in central Bosnia. The two sides confirmed that in preparing for the summit, efforts would be made to prepare a comprehensive plan for implementing the cease-fire along the entire front line and ending all combat operations to create conditions for a permanent cessation of hostilities, the protection of the population, and the implementation of confidence-building measures, the joint statement says.

Both sides confirmed that the disputes on territorial demarcation should be resolved only by peaceful, political means without the use of force and in accordance with the Sarajevo declaration dated 12 November 1993. As far as humanitarian issues are concerned, it was agreed that a commission for humanitarian issues should meet on 7 January to reach an agreement on free movement of humanitarian convoys, including discussion on establishing new routes as well as securing the

evacuation of the wounded and providing permanent supplies for hospitals. It was agreed to provide all necessary guarantees and documents for free passage of a field hospital for the eastern [Muslim-held] port of Mostar by 6 January. It was also agreed that the commission for exchange of prisoners should meet on 11 January. A meeting of the Mostar commission should be held on 7 January in the headquarters of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Spanish battalion in Medjugorje to prepare a program for the revitalization of Mostar and the return of citizens of Mostar to their city, in keeping with agreements reached at the last round of negotiations in Brussels. The agreement on the establishment of a free port zone in Ploce was confirmed.

We should also mention that for the first time proposals were put forward for the bilateral demarcation of the two republics [Herceg-Bosna and Bosnia]. The proposals are different but they represent a basis for more concrete talks. The Muslims have demanded sovereignty near Neum and the Croats have firmly rejected this. There are areas about which the two sides could negotiate bilaterally, without the third side. A meeting with the cochairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, is in progress.

Granic, Silajdzic Comment

LD0501232494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified announcer] In Vienna, the delegations of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina ended their talks this afternoon. A joint statement has been released. The statement reiterates the imperative that a cease-fire should immediately take effect; there should be a lasting cessation of hostilities as well as a lasting basis for regulating relations between the Croat and Bosnian peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It has been agreed that Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic will meet on 8 January. An agreement was also confirmed in Vienna on a free-trade zone in the port of Ploce. The cease-fire plan will be discussed in Bonn. Peace mediators Owen and Stoltenberg said that a cease-fire agreement alone would not solve the problem because in Bosnia-Herzegovina 69 cease-fires had been agreed so far while the end of the war was still not yet in sight.

Due to the protracted grave situation on the ground, proposals were tabled for the first time for mutual demarcation between the Croats and Muslims. The two sides agree that an immediate cease-fire and a lasting cessation of hostilities is in the interest of both peoples and both states. In Bonn on Saturday Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic will also discuss the organization of future political, military, territorial, and humanitarian relations between the two peoples.

[Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic] "This is by all accounts the most precious result of today's and yesterday's meetings. This means that at the meeting of the two presidents they will also talk about a cease-fire."

[Unidentified announcer] Being aware of the risks in the event of these conflicts on the ground deepening and spreading, both sides accepted peaceful solutions to the problems. They particularly discussed the need for full compliance with the existing cease-fires, especially so in central Bosnia. A comprehensive plan is being drawn up for the implementation of the cease-fire along front lines, including a suspension of all military activity, thus creating preconditions for a lasting cessation of hostilities. This plan, which must be finalized by Saturday, will include protection for the population and trust-building measures.

[Unidentified correspondent] "Do you believe there is some chance of an agreement on a cessation of hostilities in Bonn on Saturday?"

[Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic] "Talking about whether there is any chance, the answer is, in fact, yes. The answer to this question is yes. This will not be simple. I can see that there is goodwill and this is why my answer is yes, there is a chance."

[Unidentified announcer] An agreement was also reached on a free-trade zone in the port of Ploce. The cochairmen's suggestion about access to the sea near Prevlaka was explicitly rejected. For the first time, envoys Granic and Silajdzic told each other their territorial demands. For the first time, the Muslims discussed Croatia's stands on territories. On the ground in Bosnia, in the shadow of death, a diplomatic foundation for a new peace was found.

[Granic] "Both sides have taken on an obligation to do their best to implement the existing agreements and signed agreements. This means putting an end to all conflicts. In any case, to us this therefore means that the Bosnian Muslim offensive on the Croat enclaves in central Bosnia should stop, and so should conflicts along all frontlines between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will also be one of the main topics of the Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting."

[Unidentified announcer] Some of the most important results are the humanitarian solutions—a special commission will ensure the crossing of a field hospital to the left bank in Mostar tomorrow [6 January], the reconstruction of the devastated city, and the return of expelled persons according to the Brussels agreement. This will be discussed by the working group for Mostar.

[Granic] "We have achieved several concrete results. This might not seem enough, the situation being what it is, but we believe this to be a step forward—especially regarding the humanitarian situation, the Mostar issue.

"The talks were held in a constructive atmosphere. We hope it stays the same in future, but most of all we hope

that these measures and agreements at certain levels will result in a cessation of hostilities—this is the most important thing, without this all these agreements will acquire a completely different dimension. I hope we will succeed."

[Unidentified announcer] A special commission will meet on 7 January to discuss the passage of humanitarian convoys, the evacuation of the wounded, and the long-term supplying of hospitals. A commission for the exchange of prisoners will meet on 11 January.

Silajdzic on 'Constructive Atmosphere'

LD0601103194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Statement "exclusively for Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television" by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on his 5 January meeting with Croatian representatives in Vienna—live or recorded]

[Text] Today's meeting had several specific items, i.e. results. First, both sides insisted on restarting convoys, that is the passage of humanitarian convoys, including a debate on new routes. We maintain that as much food as possible should enter Bosnia-Herzegovina from various directions. We all know that despite an agreement, there were problems with the last two convoys, for Nova Bila and Maglaj. On 6 January the possibility will be examined of sending further humanitarian convoys from various directions. We spent a great deal of time discussing this, so we hope that this operation will be successful. Unfortunately, the last convoy for Nova Bila and Maglaj—we all know that the convoy for Maglaj has not reached its destination because of the Serb side. The food is still in Zenica. We hope that this time we will have more luck.

We also talked about the field hospital which has for months been kept in the port of Ploce. This is a mobile hospital stored in about 40 containers, and it has been impossible to transfer it to its destination as specified by the donor, to the left bank of Mostar. In other words, the field hospital should leave Ploce very soon for the left bank in Mostar, where it is being awaited eagerly in view of a large number of wounded [words indistinct]. It cannot possibly reach the left bank of Mostar. [passage indistinct]

We also agreed to hold a meeting to discuss exchanges of prisoners. This is a very important issue, a very difficult issue. This is nevertheless a question that constantly straddles the path to resolving some other problems we are going to try to solve. As for agreements about Mostar, our public knows that it has been agreed that Mostar is to be placed under EC administration for up to two years. Hence, during this period some solutions should be found. We called this, in a rather popular way, the Mostar for the Mostarers project. In any case we agreed that a meeting between these two commissions be also held on 7 January at the Spanish UN Protection Forces Battalion headquarters in Medjugorje, and that the question of preparing programs of restoration and revitalization and the return of Mostarers to their town be approached in line with what was agreed in Brussels.

We discussed the port of Ploce. There were some.... [pauses] The latest meeting in Brussels revealed that the Croatian side had made changes to our last agreement, reached on the Invincible, in other words, a free zone in the port of Ploce in line with the agreement reached on board the Invincible. These are some of the concrete results of our meeting. These are some of the concrete results of our meeting.

We also discussed a cease-fire. This has always been the most difficult problem. We did not want to say anything resolute or precise on a cease-fire. There can be no cease-fire for a day or two. We have to reach an agreement on the ground and we also have to agree about the technicalities, date, etc. Let us hope that some results will be achieved over this. I must say that this is the most difficult point of our talks. All I can say on my part is that the talks were held in a constructive working atmosphere. We are aware of the fact that we made a small step forward and I can just add on my part that the constructive atmosphere was a result of efforts on the part of everyone. Mr. Akmadzic represented the Herzegovina side this time and I think this greatly contributed to the talks taking a positive and not a negative turn. Let us hope this will remain so in the future, and we have guarantees from the Croatian side that Mr. Akmadzic will from now on represent this side and we see this as a positive development.

Zhirinovskiy Aide on Plans To Rule Balkans

AU0501130294 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Stanislav Stoilov, "economic expert" of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, by Valeriya Veleva at Sofia Airport; date not given: "I Shall Be President of the Balkans, and We Will Throw the Parties Into the Sea"]

[Text] A few minutes before taking off for Vienna, accompanied by the second man in command of Zhirinovskiy's party, Stanislav Stoilov, the businessman from the town of Sandanski, explained his plans for the near future related to his political activities in the Balkan peninsula. We are publishing the following interview without any editorial intervention.

[Veleva] Mr. Stoilov, while vacationing at the "Sandanski" Hotel, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy managed to pay a brief visit to Salonika. What kind of business took you to the shores of the Aegean Sea?

[Stoilov] We visited Salonika without a visa and without passports. There were approximately 10 of us, including the bodyguards, and they let us cross the border. We went there for negotiations with the government of certain people with whom we had arranged meetings in advance. [sentence as published] The Salonika police accompanied us at all times with their lights on, while, here in this country, we were met by Turkish bandits who were demonstrating against us.

[Veleva] Do you really intend to become Bulgarian president, as Mr. Zhirinovskiy designated you?

[Stoilov] Me, Bulgarian president?! This would be an insult for me. I shall become president of the Balkans (the Balkan peninsula—TRUD editorial note). This will be followed by a great upheaval in Bulgaria. We shall throw all the parties that exist in the country today into the Black Sea. The plan is ready. There will be an upheaval of all parties that were guilty for Bulgaria's disintegration from 1944 until their capitulation. All those who have committed murders, who have sent people to concentration camps, who have interned them (mispronounces the word—TRUD editorial note), who have altered streets and cities, who are guilty of laundering [waschen—in German]—all those people should be put on trial! All of them!

[Veleva] How do you plan to become president of all the Balkan states?

[Stoilov] Yes, I shall become president of all Balkans! You will hear about it. The plan is ready.

[Veleva] Who is going to help you?

[Stoilov] I shall do it all by myself! We do not need anyone's assistance. We have the strength. This is our problem. You will see.

[Veleva] When is this supposed to happen?

[Stoilov] Very soon. Macedonia's liberation, the annexation of Thracia, the seizing of Dobrudzha. All of these will become one state. Tsar Boris II, a Bulgarian who lives...in Madrid, remains the leader of all this.

[Veleva] I have never heard of such a king living in Madrid.

[Stoilov] There is a king...the son of King Boris. (He totally confuses the names—TRUD editorial note) Well, it is actually King Simeon II. He shall be the king of Bulgaria as usual.

[Veleva] Will he be subordinate to you?

[Stoilov] No, he shall rule Bulgaria, while I rule the Balkans.

[Veleva] Does it mean that Bulgaria will become a monarchy subject under a large territory ruled by a president?

[Stoilov] Yes! Bulgaria was founded 1,300 years ago by kings, and many kings have sacrificed their lives for Bulgaria, and Bulgaria, created by kings, shall be a Bulgarian kingdom. Numerous parties exist in Bulgaria today, but he (the king—TRUD editorial note) will come. I will take care of Macedonia and other states—I mean territories that belong to Bulgaria but were taken from us. I will help to annex Dobrudzha and parts of other states that were taken.... Edirne, for example, as long as it has something to do with Yugoslavia and Macedonia. [sentence as published] How exactly the Balkans will be ruled with Bulgaria remains to be clarified in a personal talk with King Simeon II, who lives in Spain. We shall hold a conference with him. I contacted his secretary—she speaks Bulgarian—and after the New Year, I mean after the holidays, we shall hold such a meeting.

[Veleva] How is the Bulgarian republic expected to turn into a kingdom?

[Stoilov] This is.... It is related to a plan that we must await. It is a long-term plan, very long-term, indeed. There are many things we cannot tell you in advance because you are a journalist. If you were a politician, and if we were sitting in a room behind closed doors, and if you belonged to our party, we might reveal the whole plan to you. However, it is our own plan. We shall never leave the Balkans and the Bulgarians under different commands, with territories robbed from all parts. Bulgaria and Macedonia together shall be a great state.

[Veleva] Are those plans of yours likely to provoke a military conflict in the Balkans?

[Stoilov] We are so strong that no one would dare to do anything. In saying "we," I mean our party—Mr. Zhirinovskiy's party!

[Veleva] How did he react to his expulsion from Bulgaria?

[Stoilov] He was not expelled from Bulgaria. They know that he is dangerous, for Bulgaria as well; hence, they have no right to expel him. He is my personal friend. I asked him to stay another five days, but he has his own program. They (the authorities—TRUD editorial note) could never expel him. I have an Austrian passport and a Bulgarian passport. Me, being a citizen of Bulgaria, he can stay with me for another 100 years. This so-called provision that he must be expelled from Bulgaria is part of the propaganda spread by the other parties.

[Veleva] Did you meet Todor Zhivkov?

[Stoilov] No, but we would like to meet him. He is nicer than Zhelyu Zhelev. There was discipline under him, and he is not guilty. He was ruled by Moscow.

[Veleva] I know that it is not a very decent question, but are you a rich man?

[Stoilov] I have worked hard and I am a rich man, as a matter of fact. I have several millions, but I am not a billionaire. However, I do have a lot of money. I have purchased automobiles and apartments for my sisters, as well as my sisters' children. My house in Sveti Vrach, called Sandanski today, which was confiscated in the past, is being totally rebuilt. I am also building a house with four floors in the Pirin mountain, at a height of 1,300 meters. I usually visit Bulgaria once or twice a month, but we are starting on a world tour now. We have very important tasks.

[Veleva] Was Mr. Zhirinovskiy very offended when he left Bulgaria?

[Stoilov] He was very offended by Mr. Zhelev's policy because they [the Russians] have liberated Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, which lasted 500 years, and no matter which party he belongs to, he is a Soviet man, after all.

(In the meantime, Mr. Venedikov, who is the second man in command of Zhirinovskiy's party and future defense minister-designate, joined the conversation and stated as follows—TRUD editorial note)

[Venedikov] As soon as we take over the power in Russia, the fate of the whole world shall be predetermined. Everything will fall into place, as it is correct and appropriate for the peoples of all countries.

'Rebirth' Leader Gelemenov Interviewed

AU0501165694 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 29 Dec 93 pp 1,4

[First installment of interview with Father Georgi Gelemenov, leader of the extreme right-wing "Rebirth" [Vuzrazhdane] Organization and cofounder of the "United Bulgarian Soldiery" [Obedineno Bulgarsko Voynstvo] organization, by Svetlana Krustev; place and date not given: "I Advocate A New National Rebirth Process That Would Restore the Turks' Bulgarian Names"]

[Text] [Krusteva] Father Gelemenov, in the last elections you relied on the nationalist card and lost. What makes you think that nationalism has more of a chance of success in Bulgaria today?

[Gelemenov] We lost because we did not manage to accomplish our task as we should have. Many other formations existed that called themselves nationalist, and I have the feeling that the election results were forged, anyway. Since, as you say, the nationalist idea is fading, I created a new theory that is actually an old one, namely the Nazi idea. I would like to introduce this idea to Bulgaria, and as its promoter, I shall propagate the theory of moderate racism.

[Krusteva] What does your theory represent?

[Gelemenov] I am planning to publish a pamphlet on the subject in the near future, so that people can see it in print. It is a theory that divides Bulgaria's population into three groups, according to their ethnic origins, namely: Bulgarians who are the indigenous residents of the country should represent the first category. The Gypsies who immigrated during the period of the great migration should represent the second category, while the third category should be composed of the Turks who were the invaders. The second and third categories of people should be subject to the first category, according to my moderate racial theory. This is so, because, we, the white people in Bulgaria, are the indigenous residents of this country. In this respect I include another subcategory that is not racial, but represents a social group, intent on dividing the Bulgarian nation and troubling the souls of Christians. I am talking of the religious sects. This is actually the lowest category of people on my list.

[Krusteva] Do you realize that all your theories are in contradiction to the Bulgarian Constitution?

[Gelemenov] Yes, but it does not bother me, because the Bulgarian Constitution is only a bunch of papers loosely bound together with glue and string. On the other hand, my theory is based on the natural moral code, which is deeply rooted in the souls and hearts of the Bulgarian people and calls for such a racial segregation.

[Krusteva] You had some relations with the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in the past. Why did you not join that formation?

[Gelemenov] On 18 April 1990, when we, all the well-known dissidents, were supposed to gather and establish the grouping that should have guaranteed the country's progress....

[Krusteva] You were not admitted to the conference?

[Gelemenov] Yes, indeed. The current president Zhelyu Zhelev slammed the door in front of my face, without any explanation. When I shook hands with him upon stepping down from the bus, he took my hand for one second, and then dropped it. It was suggested to him that he not work with me, as I later heard, and he is supposed to have called me a fascist.

[Krusteva] Who suggested to him that he should not cooperate with you?

[Gelemenov] It was that fellow Ivaylo Trifonov [one of Zhelev's current advisers], I think. I already had several interviews with Radio Free Europe [RFE]. Together with Khristofor Subev we founded the formation called "In Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values." Naturally, we separated, later on. My most important action was on 10 October 1989. I celebrated a requiem for the Polish priest Jerzy Popieluszko. Only a few people learned about it, but if you can find the GAZETA WYBORCZA of those days, you can see my picture with my hand raised in the victory sign, and wearing clerical robes. On that occasion RFE and BBC made a big fuss about me, which seems to have evoked President Zhelev's jealousy.

[Krusteva] Do you feel insulted by the term "fascist?"

[Gelemenov] I am not impressed. I am not a racist, this is a leftist doctrine that has no place in my ideology. I am a Nazi, which means an extreme right nationalist, and this is the exact meaning of the term Nazi. It is an updated, accessible form, aimed at introducing law and order, and discipline in our country, and guaranteeing employment for all Bulgarians, mainly for Bulgarians.

[Krusteva] Father Gelemenov, is all this not in contradiction to your religion?

[Gelemenov] No. Christ himself said: "I have not came to bring peace on earth, but the sword." When he saw the tradesmen who had turned the temple into a "change office," he chased them away with a whip. Hence, it is sometimes necessary to turn the other page of Christian religion, which is rather militant and even aggressive. The Bulgarian people were converted by force, as a matter of fact.

[Krusteva] However, God said: "You must love your neighbor."

[Gelemenov] I love him, but the Bulgarian is my neighbor. The Gypsy and the Turk are not my brothers, they are my enemies.

[Krusteva] Nevertheless, the Bible preaches that one should love one's enemies....

[Gelemenov] Let us rid this divine commandment from our memory for a while, and turn to history instead. The priest Gruyo Banski is one of my favorite historical figures, a man for whom I have the greatest respect. I come from Banya Village, Panaguyrishte area, myself, a matter of fact. That man, when he used to take Turkish prisoners during the 19th century liberation war, had a peculiar method of converting them to Christianity, namely with bacon. Knowing that they could not stand pork meat, he used to stuff their mouths with a piece of bacon and tell them: "You were Hassan, from now on you shall be called Ivan." In this context, I advocate a new national rebirth process that would restore the Bulgarian names of Turks and Gypsies who have adopted Arab names. I have already contributed to such actions by sending a telegram to the headmaster of the local school in Kayaloba, Kurdzhali area, who dismissed the ethnic Bulgarian Ivan Stoychev and took over his post. I wrote to him the following letter: "The national rebirth process is under way, and your post should be immediately assigned to an ethnic Bulgarian."

[Krusteva] But, this is a threat.

[Gelemenov] Let them get a little frightened, it is only to our advantage. Let them be afraid of us, so as to remind them that we are the indigenous residents of this country.

[Krusteva] Have you no respect whatsoever for an individual's right to self-identification [as published]?

[Gelemenov] Whenever our national security is affected, there can be no question of human rights. All important local government functions in Bulgarian rural areas should be assigned to Bulgarians.

[Krusteva] What about your participation in the establishment of armed units under the "United Bulgarian Soldiery" formation that we already reported?

[Gelemenov] I am a cofounder of the formation, but the idea of establishing such militant units for the defense of Bulgaria's honor and national pride belongs to Krum Kumanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Fatherland Party. I had to participate in the establishment of the organization, because my ideas coincide with his. As long as the units we decided to establish yesterday are still unarmed, they shall act within the framework of the extreme rightwing "Vuzrazhdane" organization, namely, they will use force whenever necessary, applying methods of oriental martial art and other forms of physical assault. As far as the armed units are concerned, Mr. Kumanov expressly stated that we shall consult with the police forces and the Army, so as not to get involved with the law, which might cause us difficulties.

[Krusteva] The police do not seem very enthusiastic about your initiative....Do you have a sufficient number of volunteers?

[Gelemenov] This is something you should ask Mr. Kumanov. However, volunteers, ready to defend the Bulgarian citizens against the crimes of gangsters and Gypsy elements who are killing, raping, and robbing all over the place, and against those who are trying to split our motherland, namely the ethnic Turks, can be easily found. However, we should not lay the emphasis on the weapons of such units. In the first place, they should be regarded as people who evoke the respect of those who encroach upon discipline, and as people who are trying to introduce discipline in our country.

[TRUD editorial note] TRUD is carrying the above interview in accordance with its principle of publishing all existing political views on the country's situation. In this special case we are apologizing to all our readers with more delicate sensibilities.

Second Installment Published

AU0501191794 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 p 3

[Second installment of interview with Father Georgi Gelemenov, leader of the extreme right-wing "Rebirth" Organization, by Svetlana Krusteva; place and date not given: "I Advocate a New National Rebirth Process Which Should Restore the Turks' Bulgarian Names"]

[Text] We continue the interview with Father Georgi Gelemenov, leader of the extreme right "Rebirth" [Vuzrazhdane] Organization and of the Bulgarian Christian Democratic Party (center) who declared himself as the restorer of Nazism in Bulgaria. "Gypsies and Turks are not my brothers, they are killing, raping, robbing, and trying to split our fatherland," Gelemenov said in the previous installment of his TRUD interview. Our editorial board is in possession of a recorded transcript and would like to hear the opinion of the Prosecutor's Office on the matter.

[Krusteva] Mr. Gelemenov, do you admit that some ethnic Bulgarians are also guilty of rape, robberies, and murders?

[Gelemenov] Bulgarians who are stealing, robbing, and raping automatically belong to the category of criminals who are violating the law, public order, and discipline; hence I do not distinguish between them and other criminals.

[Krusteva] Why did you choose Plovdiv for your headquarters?

[Gelemenov] Because the ethnic spectrum of that city is the most colorful. Plovdiv has the largest number of Gypsies, Turks, but also Armenians and Jews, whom I have nothing against, of course. However, the triple agglomeration, namely of Bulgarians, Turks, and Gypsies, prompted me to select that city. The United Bulgarian Soldiery is expected to establish armed militant units with the cooperation of the police and the Armed Forces. Naturally my "Rebirth" Organization is aimed at establishing its own, unarmed units. I do not approve of the use of weapons, because I do not wish to get involved with the law. I rely on the mass character of the units which I am planning to establish. I would like my people to assist the police in coping with the Gypsies, so that the crime rate may be reduced to 2 or 3 percent. I expect them to cooperate in protecting law, order, and discipline.

[Krusteva] It is strange that you do not comply with the Bulgarian Constitution, but are ready to cooperate with the police forces.

[Gelemenov] It is because the police force is a law enforcement institution in charge of introducing public order. The constitution is a document of a certain value, but is not as effective as the penal code. The constitution is not without flaws. It contains some pompous postulates, which, we Nazis of Bulgaria, do not wish to comply with, because it bans all organizations based on ethnic principles, and so forth. The constitution does not serve our purposes, on the contrary it restricts our freedom of action.

[Krusteva] Are you not afraid of conflicts involving bloodshed? How would the ethnic minorities react to a new national rebirth process?

[Gelemenov] Precisely as they reacted in the 1984-85 period. They rose against the forces of law and order in Bulgaria, and were immediately crushed, of course. I do not understand why monuments should be erected in their memory today, why prayers and speeches in the Turkish language should be recited for them—which is in contradiction with the constitution, as a matter of fact. As long as they are violating the constitution, we should be also entitled to do so. Violence is called for in the purpose of introducing law and order in the country. What they are trying to present to us as democracy is nothing but anarchy and disorder. As long as the state is unwilling to apply even methods of force against the violators of public order, I am willing to organize a bunch of decent boys who shall introduce law and order all over the country, and to become their leader.

[Krusteva] Do you think that anyone would support you?

[Gelemenov] What do you mean support me?! Young people are already following me everywhere, people are calling me from all parts of the country announcing their eagerness to work with me. I am expecting the 30 boys, who are currently trying to introduce law and order in the Burgas area, to call on me. I could be useful to them with funds for gasoline.

[Krusteva] Do you have any political ambitions?

[Gelemenov] The whole thing is actually the rudiments of a party which we intend to register after the New Year and which will be called the Nationalist Socialist Vuzrazhdane Party. I am convinced that National Socialism is the only idea capable of guaranteeing Bulgaria's progress.

[Krusteva] It is a theory which was rejected and condemned by the whole world, Mr. Gelemenov.

[Gelemenov] This does not frighten me. If we should accept that history is developing in the form of a spiral, I am convinced that the idea of national socialism is being revived. I am not the first one to adopt it for the sake of helping my country. The idea is not dead, it is acquiring new roots. This is precisely the right moment for its development in Bulgaria.

[Krusteva] I understood that you felt insulted by being called the "Bulgarian Zhirinovskiy." Why?

[Gelemenov] Prior to Zhirinovskiy's arrival in our country, I was willing to meet him, in a way. However, as soon as he stepped onto Bulgarian soil, he started talking such nonsense, that I immediately unmasked him as the

great Russian clown who came here to spread unrest and provoke internal conflicts. Speaking about the annexation of Mizia, Thracia, and Macedonia to Bulgaria, he forgot to mention Dobrudzha. The idea of annexation is good, but it should be promoted through diplomatic channels. I am convinced that Zhirinovskiy is a paid "agent provocateur" who was sent on a performing tour. He is a CIA agent [as published] and his purpose is to provoke bloodshed and armed clashes in the Balkan peninsula. I insist that Mr. Tatarchev, the chief prosecutor, should immediately expel Zhirinovskiy from Bulgaria, that he should be fined at the border, and should no longer be permitted to step on our territory.

[Krusteva] Like yourself, Zhirinovskiy does not like the president. Why did you declare Dr. Zhelev as an accomplice of crimes committed in our country?

[Gelemenov] With the moratorium on capital punishment which he issued, he acted as an accomplice of bloody murders, chiefly committed against Bulgarians, because the criminals are no longer afraid. I approve Zhirinovskiy's idea that the president should be replaced, but this is none of his business. It is an internal Bulgarian affair.

[Krusteva] However, you are expecting some financial support from Russia for your "United Bulgarian Soldiery." Whom exactly, are you relying upon?

[Gelemenov] I am expecting financial aid from the organization called "Russian National Unity" and from the Slavonic Assembly. Being the cofounder of a bank in Russia with capital investments amounting to 10 million rubles, this is where I am expecting the resources to come from, but it will not be today or tomorrow. It is an organization headed by Aleksandr Barkashov, whose whereabouts are unknown today, and who was actually backed by Rutskoy. Considering that Rutskoy was prevented from running for the elections, the roving mountebank Zhirinovskiy exploited his votes. According to my own information, seven of my boys, I mean our boys, were killed in the attack against Ostankino. This was actually Yeltsin's fault.

[Krusteva] Has anybody told you that you are mad?

[Gelemenov] Everyone is more or less mad, because no criteria exist for a normal state of mind. I do not consider myself mad, because I would not have obtained a certificate of mental sanity when I got married. I now intend to purchase a license to carry firearms, hence I can hardly be considered mad. I think that I am a normal Bulgarian citizen who is planning to lead the country into the open space. Bulgaria's situation could be improved on the basis of a simple political scheme—without a parliament and without a government. A council of ministers, subordinate to a strong personality, would be competent enough to rule the country.

[Krusteva] You are talking about a strong hand, one-man power, and so forth, is that so?

[Gelemenov] A very strong hand, an iron-strong hand, is required, as a matter of fact. The Bulgarian people, just like the Russian people, are used to it.

[Krusteva] What do you think about Adolf Hitler?

[Gelemenov] He was the man who helped the Germans to regain their self-confidence, who showed the common German citizen that he is the master of this earth. He fully eradicated crime, he did away with unemployment. His mistake was to wage a war against Poland and Russia. He was a brilliant politician, but an evil man. Nevertheless, his economic methods and those of his supporters could be successfully applied in contemporary Bulgaria. We could also work hard if someone would guide us and show us how to do it.

Ethnic Tension Fueled by 'Racist' Gelemenov

AU0501153094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 3 Jan 94 p 6

[Commentary by Stoyan Tsvetkov: "Racist and Gypsies"]

[Text] Pretenders of Hitler and Mussolini's dark glory have appeared in Bulgaria.

The extravagant Father Georgi Gelemenov, leader of one of the dozens of phantom parties who owes his popularity only to his scandalous statements and unexpected political turns, has declared a war on the Gypsies.

Naturally, the Gypsies also declared a war on the racist-Christian Democrat. Ethnic tension in Plovdiv and other cities is increasing. Without underestimating the power of the authorities or overestimating the possibilities of the "skinheads," there is no guarantee that bloody ethnic clashes will not take place in Bulgaria in 1994.

There is, however, two sides to the coin. By their inactivity in anything related to resolving the Gypsies' social problems, the state institutions are facilitating the growth of the crime rate among them and the emergence of racist moods among a part of the Bulgarian society. This is a fertile soil for the growth of political adventurists of the ilk of the aforementioned priest.

One way or another, Bulgaria is not immune to the xenophobia virus. This allows other interested groups to implement their political ambitions under the noble slogan of fighting against chauvinism and racism.

Dimitrov, Videnov Discuss Parliament Activity

AU0501180594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] On 5 January Zhan Videnov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], came to 134 Rakovski Street [headquarters of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS], where he met Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council. The meeting took place at the insistence of the BSP. After the meeting the two

leaders made statements on the more important aspects of their meeting. First the host, Filip Dimitrov:

[Begin Dimitrov recording] The first topic we discussed was the issue of the parliamentary order and the risks involved in violating this order if the parliament will be paralyzed until new elections take place. This could be a period of time during which Bulgaria would have a caretaker cabinet. It is well-known that the SDS submitted a proposal on amending the Constitution in this aspect.

We also discussed the issue of the Supreme Judicial Council. The position of the SDS on this matter is very clear. We think that the BSP position on this matter is anticonstitutional, and I explained this to Mr. Videnov.

The third issue he invoked was related to the differences of the two major political forces in anything related to the matter of municipal by-elections. The possibility of eliminating the differences was discussed. We think that not allowing parties that are not represented in the parliament, to participate in those elections is an illegal act. However, we will think in the future about the specific form of resolving this problem.

Generally, I would say that the visit was an indication of the problems that are discussed or that exist in the BSP, and I think that the SDS could not be expected to get involved in those problems. [end recording]

BSP leader Zhan Videnov said that he is satisfied with the meeting because the conversation clarified the positions of the two most important political forces in Bulgarian public life, and this according to him means regulating political life, imbuing it with a predictable and normal character. This is what Zhan Videnov said:

[Begin Videnov recording] We discussed the necessity of guaranteeing the functioning of the parliament and the developments of the political life of the country, regardless of the shortcomings of the constitutional and legal arrangements. We also discussed the necessity of eliminating the existing normative and judicial obstacles that prevent the main political forces from fully participating in municipal by-elections.

We made our proposals in this sphere and clarified our positions. Relevant information was exchanged between the main political organs of the two parties. We do not plan new meetings, but perhaps specific future parliamentary and political actions will emerge as a result of our meeting today. [end recording]

Rights Group Alleges 'Double Standard' for Parties

AU0501104994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by Mitko Bozhkov]

[Text] Today the authorities are following a double standard: They forbid political manifestations by Gypsies, Turks, Vlakhs, and Macedonians, while they permit the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] and a number of Christian parties—the United Christian Democratic Center, Christian Agrarian Party, Christian Democratic Union, Christian Republican Party, and others—to operate in contravention of the Constitution. The Sofia Helsinki Watch organization made this assertion in its review of the state of human rights in Bulgaria during 1993.

The association considers that the Constitutional Court should be consulted again for a ruling on how far the DPS conforms to the Constitution. At the last DPS national conference Ahmed Dogan declared that the movement is "a party on an ethnic basis," which is forbidden by the Constitution.

The association points out that at present the courts refuse to register parties on an ethnic and religious basis.

The Sofia Helsinki Watch considers that the Political Parties Act is very liberal. The absence of any meaningful lower limit for the number of members in a party permits the existence of dozens of citizens' associations that engage political activity in theory, but in practice mainly exist to exploit the privileges of duty-free imports.

Klaus Calms Russian Fears on NATO Growth

LD0501234394 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] In contrast to the small countries of Central Europe and those in the area that still continue to split up, Russia is a great power as far as the United States and other NATO members are concerned. It is a country with which they are having to reckon. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has declared this in reaction to the remark made by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who today called on NATO member countries to disperse Russia's fears that they have adopted a duplicitous attitude on this issue.

Yeltsin also warned against the negative reaction of the Russian public in case the bloc is expanded. He described the arguments of those countries striving to gain entry into NATO as unconvincing. Prime Minister Klaus is conscious that Russia regards this to be a sensitive issue. However, there is no need for fear yet because, as the prime minister has said, no one has offered us NATO membership.

Klaus on Planned Talks of Visegrad Four

LD0501224294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The Czech cabinet discussed in Prague today technical details of the visit to Prague next week of U.S. President Bill Clinton and an increase in the number of police. Our Prague correspondent, Daniela Galikova, attended the ensuing news conference and filed the following report:

[Galikova] Replying to a question from Slovak radio, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus confirmed the planned talks with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar as well as with the prime ministers of Poland and Hungary, which will take place after the talks with the U.S. President. On the evening of 12 January—that is, after the U.S. President departs—the Czech president, prime minister, and foreign minister will give dinners. According to Prime Minister Klaus, the presidents of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will dine at the Castle, the prime ministers of these countries will dine at Prime Minister Klaus's invitation in Lichtenstein Palace, and the foreign ministers will dine at the Czech Foreign Ministry.

Responding to another question concerning the summit, Prime Minister Klaus stressed that, right from the beginning, as soon as President Clinton's intention to visit Prague was announced, the Czech Republic did not doubt that it would use the meeting for holding talks with the representatives of the Visegrad Group countries. At no time was it considered that only we would be holding talks or that the talks would be held collectively, the Czech prime minister stressed. He thus reacted to some reports carried by both the domestic and foreign press that the Czech Republic did not support the idea of joint talks between the representatives of the Visegrad Group and the U.S. President.

Klaus Discusses Constitutional Arrangement

AU0501174794 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 3 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by sr: "According to Klaus, Higher Bodies Are Not the Most Urgent Problem"]

[Text] Prague—As Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said on the Debata television program on CT1 yesterday, he knows there are much more important and urgent problems than the establishment of higher administrative bodies. Thus he responded in the new program to questions by reporters concerning the establishment of these bodies and the state administration reform.

Moreover, he said that it is questionable whether this issue requires an immediate and deep involvement. He, himself, as he said, will not support this rather harsh approach. He said further that he supports such an approach only if he is certain that an immediate and harsh solution to a particular problem is useful and necessary. At present, however, he does not see the constitutional arrangement as the most important and urgent problem.

Further, the prime minister pointed out that the higher territorial bodies "undoubtedly will cost something, and it will not be little." Here, he added, one could ask whether the price is worth the gain brought about by the establishment and operation of these bodies. To a direct question concerning the quality of the documentation submitted by Kalvoda's Office for Legislature and Public Administration regarding the issue of the constitutional arrangement reform, Klaus replied that this document is a topic for discussion in the government, but he added that the document does not deal with the problem of financing the establishment of the higher administrative bodies. "Some people see only the advantages of the administrative bodies, others are concerned precisely with the cost of their establishment and operation. That is the basic conflict," the prime minister added. According to him, the questions of powers, budget, financing, property relations between the territorial bodies, and other points that are connected with the administrative reform have not yet been solved. Nevertheless, he himself does not reject the administrative reform, and the Civic Democratic Party will not, according to him, block the emergence of the higher bodies. In this context, he pointed out that the government found a solution to the constitutional arrangement problem, which was sent to the parliament just before the end of last year in the form of draft principles for the constitutional law on the establishment of higher autonomous territorial bodies and a schedule for legislative measures toward the implementation of the administrative reform. He also mentioned individual deadlines for the implementation of the gradual steps that would lead

to the establishment of higher bodies. He denied, however, that the coalition leaders agreed on some specific date for the election to these bodies. Nevertheless, he said that for many reasons it would not be desirable for the elections to take place every year.

[Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 4 January on page 9 also carries a report on Klaus's appearance on the television program and adds: "Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus rejected on the Czech Television program that part of President Vaclav Havel's New Year's address that deals with the tasks of the Cabinet. Klaus is convinced that his government is paying equal attention to all important issues."]

Deputy Prime Minister on Territorial Division

AU0501162794 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 30 Dec 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda by Roman Krasnicky; place and date not given: "I Am Afraid of People's Apathy"]

[Text] Jan Kalvoda, deputy prime minister and chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], is a politician who, unlike the prime minister, unequivocally favors the reforms of the self-administration system. However, Kalvoda is ruling out the possibility that the coalition could disintegrate because of those reforms.

[Krasnicky] According to Deputy V. Dobal, the ODA has reached the conclusion that the government is unreliable in that respect. This is why they are going to draft a law on nonprofit organizations. How do you feel as a member of the government and, at the same time, a member of the party that is criticizing the government?

[Kalvoda] This reflects tensions between the government and parliament. This anomaly ensues from the coalition mechanisms. Yes, I am a member of a party that is stressing the need for a general adjustment to the nonprofit sector and has a strong idea about the fact that a law should be drafted that would create room for civic activity. All government members play this double role inasmuch as they are dependent on their party and their sector. The situation, however, has not exceeded tenable limits.

[Krasnicky] The prime minister yesterday signed a schedule for reforming the public administration. Did you not feel quite lonely when fighting for this reform? Did other ODA ministers support you? It might seem that this is a Kalvoda-Klaus personal dispute....

[Kalvoda] I do not want to divulge any details from government meetings, but I can say that two ODA ministers, apart from myself, were of the same opinion. This dispute is not a dispute between two individuals. If you just look at the ODA election program, you can see that the self-administration issue plays a key role. We know that we have to implement this reform now. Time is important in this case. The thing is that citizens have to be given, apart from assurances that they have powers, a new role in that self-administration. If this does not happen right now, I am afraid that the apathy we observe today will increase even more.

[Krasnicky] Vaclav Klaus is pointing to the risks ensuing from territorial and administrative reform. He is afraid, for example, that the principle of civic solidarity could be endangered if the new system of local budgets is implemented. Are you also aware of certain risks?

[Kalvoda] No. This seems to be a misunderstanding to me. It has been evident since the very beginning—when we signed the coalition agreement—that a self-administration unit without its own income is no self-administration unit at all. This is not a new risk factor. This is a needed feature that any self-administrative unit must have, as a rack wagon must have wheels. Documents that I presented to the government over the summer contain two basic models for financing regions and lands. We could also redistribute the financial sources through the state budget, like they are doing in the northern, mostly social democratic, countries—that is, we could try to set up dozens of objective criteria, according to which money from the state budget would flow into self-administrative units. According to another alternative that I am supporting, the new units could receive their income from taxes.

[Krasnicky] You have mentioned cooperation within the coalition several times. What are the reasons for the misunderstanding? Is prestige sometimes involved?

[Kalvoda] All the issues, whether we want self-administration or not, whether we want nonprofit organizations or not, are conceptual issues. As someone who is present at the negotiations, I cannot objectively say whether personal views prevail in this dispute. Emotions should not play any role in politics.

Slovakia Surpassed Clearing Account Margin

AU0501174394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by fr: "The Slovak Republic Exceeded the Clearing Account Margin"]

[Text] Prague—The deficit of Slovakia on the clearing account for trade with the Czech Republic reached the amount of 169.39 million ECU's on 31 December 1993. Hence, the margin set by the payments agreement (130 million ECU's) has been overdrawn for the first time since this method of financing of the trade between the Czech and the Slovak Republics was introduced.

Interest of 10 percent is due on the amount by which the margin was overdrawn, and, according to the payment agreement, the debtor must cover this amount in convertible currency within 15 days. Otherwise, the penalty interest is raised to 15 percent. The Czech National Bank has not planned talks with the Slovak side so far because the debtor should cover the margin excess practically

automatically, Jan Vit, vice governor of the Czech National Bank told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY yesterday in this respect.

The Czech National Bank is conducting a so-called annulment of the old lot and its transfer to the new lot at the end of each month. In December, the old lot shows a deficit in Slovak payments in the amount of 46.78 million ECU's, and, on the new lot, the Czech Republic had a surplus of 122.13 million ECU's. The old lot records in the 1 to 1 ratio all payments for trade prior to the currency separation; the new lot records payments for trading after this date.

Southern Slovaks Call For Protection of Rights

AU0501174594 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Jan 94 p 2

["Third Memorandum of Slovaks from Southern Slovakia," adopted at the "sixth meeting of Slovaks living in southern Slovakia" in Surany on 2 January]

[Text] We Slovaks, living since time immemorial in the south of our homeland, appeal, in a situation that we cannot call anything but one in which the state is endangered, to the president, parliament, and Government of the Slovak Republic.

Now it is no longer just a matter of concern to us, who feel discriminated against and endangered in our own country, a fact to which we have been drawing attention, so far in vain, in our earlier memorandums from 1990-93.

The appeal, issued by the so-called Association of Zitny Ostrov Towns and Villages and that which is planned for Komarno on 8 January 1994, is an obvious anticonstitutional attempt to subvert the state. Therefore, we appeal:

1. To the supreme state bodies of the Slovak Republic not to permit anticonstitutional goings-on in that assembly, and their consequences.

2. To the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] to revise its resolution of 23 June 1993 (concerning Council of Europe recommendation Number 1201) in accordance with the Constitution and the legal system of the Slovak Republic.

3. To the NRSR to pass a law on the protection of the state language.

4. To ensure that at least one Slovak school or class be functioning in every community of the Slovak Republic.

5. To ensure that, in the bilingual designation of towns and communities, the transcription of their present Slovak names into the language of the minority be used.

6. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to advise European structures, and the Council of Europe in particular, that the recognition of above-standard rights for the Hungarian minority sets a dangerous precedent that might lead to destabilization in other European countries as well.

7. To the church authorities to ensure that religious services in the Slovak language be held in every town and village.

8. To the NRSR to pass a law on the protection of the Republic, in the spirit of the "Second Memorandum."

To Citizens of Hungarian Nationality

Esteemed fellow citizens of Hungarian nationality! At the threshold of the second year of our common republic, we appeal to you, in the interest of continued peaceful coexistence, not to yield to political pressures undermining our stability and, thereby, head off the creation of any social conflicts.

The Slovak Republic is our common homeland and belongs to all of us. Let us therefore, as citizens, seek common ground; let us seek the path toward unity and toward the stability and enhancement of our common homeland.

Accept this new year's message as a call for further peaceful and virtuous coexistence in the common homeland.

Call For Local Government Meeting Published

94CH0153A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian 15 Dec 93 p 1

[Text of appeal issued by the Association of Towns and Villages of Velky Zitny Ostrov to local governments in southern Slovakia, dated 6 December 1993: "Appeal"; includes "Supporting Statement" issued by leaders of the Coexistence Political Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] txt
[Text] Dear Fellow Mayors and Representatives!

We are contacting you regarding a vital issue! For the first time in its history, the Association of Csallokoz [Velky Zitny Ostrov] Towns and Villages is calling a national, grand meeting of all elected representatives, mayors, and parliamentary representatives of southern Slovakia. Just why did we decide to call a national grand meeting?

We did so to express our unanimous view: The government of this country is ruining us. It inhibits our development potential because it deprives us of the possibility to exercise rights to which individuals and communities in every constitutional state are entitled, and because it withholds some of the funds our municipalities are entitled to receive. It limits the exercise of our autonomous rights, and the evolution of autonomous local governments. The government is planning to implement a state administrative and regional reorganization over our heads, one that is akin to the one we have already experienced in the era of centralized state administration and autocracy. This would violate the principle of self-governance, and from our standpoint, would mean another deprivation of rights.

The political leadership of the country is spreading propaganda of a kind that creates social unrest, and incites coexisting Slovaks and Hungarians against each other. It makes Hungarians appear as enemies of Slovakia. It endeavors to turn against each other the Hungarian people of southern Slovakia and their parliamentary representatives elected through democratic processes.

Danger signals, which characterize our social, political, and economic situation, prompt us to call a national,

grand meeting of the elected Hungarian representatives of this large region, who share our interests.

We are aware of the fact that, according to every indication, the highest degree of mutual tolerance exists in this large region spanning from Pozsony [Bratislava] to the Ukrainian border, where a mass of about 600,000 Hungarians lives. This is in contrast to the prevailing atmosphere in other parts of the country. There are mutual, good relations between the Hungarian and Slovak people who live here; they are bonded by historical roots and have established productive social relations and the basic conditions for an economy capable of evolving. We must reap the benefits of this valuable situation by acting on the basis of our common will, and this is why we jointly state: Based on Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe, the establishment of a province with special legal status, with its own local government and administration, is needed in areas where significant numbers of Hungarians reside. An area having such status would preserve and enrich European values that, in the course of the past several decades, have gradually withered in this region.

With that, we also want to state our firm demand to settle the legal status of the Hungarian national community in Slovakia, in a manner consistent with the proposed draft constitution prepared by the parliamentary representatives of the Hungarian coalition. At the same time, let us also declare that as a result of this settlement, the rights of Slovak people residing in the same area, but in a minority compared to us, must not be infringed upon in any respect.

Let us elect from among the participants of the grand meeting a 100-member committee charged with the implementation of resolutions adopted by the meeting.

We recognize the special mission of this historic meeting in the fact that by virtue of its positions it would unite the politically divided Hungarian people of Slovakia. Our jointly agreed-upon concepts concerning our fate would not become prey to partisan struggles.

For this reason we are calling upon all mayors, local government representatives, and parliamentary representatives in southern Slovakia, irrespective of their political and ideological commitments, to take part in the national grand meeting to be held on 8 January 1994 in Komarom [Komarno]!

Council of the Association of
Ilokoz Towns and Villages

Komarom, 6 December 1994

Supporting Statement

A resolution was passed at the 7 December 1993 conference designed to streamline the leadership policies of the Coexistence Movement and the MKDM [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] to the effect that the two organizations would join forces in supporting the announcement of the Association of Csallokoz Towns and Villages, calling upon every Hungarian elected representative and mayor, as well as parliamentary representative in southern Slovakia, irrespective of party affiliation or ideological orientation, to take part in the Komarom national grand meeting to be held on 8 January 1994.

The two organizations agree with the contents of the call publicized by the Association of Csallokoz Towns and Villages, and have agreed that they would participate in the political preparatory work to organize the meeting in order to ensure the success of this national action.

On behalf of the Coexistence Movement: Miklos Duray, Istvan Harna, Miklos Feher.

On behalf of the MKDM: Bela Bugar, Pal Farkas, Pal Csaky.

Military Academy Chief Views Army Education

AU0501154594 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 3 Jan 94 p 9

[Interview with Lieutenant General Anton Slimak, "interim rector" of the Liptovsky Mikulas Military Academy, by Maria Tolnayova in Liptovsky Mikulas; date not given: "Future Lies in Integration"]

[Excerpts] Liptovsky Mikulas—The post-November 1989 changes and the founding of an independent Slovak Republic and, hence, of a new army have called forth changes in the system of military education as well. [passage omitted]

There was no other way but to transform this type of school. The founding of the Liptovsky Mikulas Military Academy [VVLM] was the first stage of this transformation.

What Kind of Experts Do We Need?

This is a question of principle, Lieutenant General Engineer Anton Slimak, whom the minister of defense and the Slovak president charged with acting as the VVLM interim commander and rector, told us. The problem is that we know our needs—that is, who must be added where for the Army to be functional—only from today's perspective. Because the Army of the Slovak Republic [ASR] is facing the exacting task of transforming itself, hardly anyone can say today what we will require three years from now, for example. Yet the system of education must be at least one step ahead. The VVLM, which is the legal successor to the former VVTS [Military Technical College] in this city and to the Military Pedagogical College in Bratislava, educates at four faculties specialists for ground troops, air defense, logistics, and command and control of arms systems. [passage omitted]

The VVLM has taken over all students of higher military educational establishments who studied in the Czech Republic. They represent a full one-third of the 12,000

students who currently attend the VVLM. Many of them were studying in highly specialized fields with a small number of students, and their further placement was problematic. It was not possible to establish a chair for two or three students. The Ministry of Defense therefore concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Education and, subsequently, with individual universities, under which these students study according to the programs of studies of the relevant [nonmilitary] faculties. This also applies to the study of general medicine. Physicians for Army needs used to be trained at the Military Medical Academy at Hradec Kralove [in the Czech Republic]. Its students have transferred to the P.J. Safarik University in Kosice, and the first year of the study of medicine for the ASR's needs has been opened at the Medical School of Jesenius University in Martin. On the basis of experience from cooperation with these civilian schools, we will also reorganize studies at the VVLM. A total of 64 specializations are at present being studied within the framework of the Army. This is a phenomenon that must be radically reassessed, says Anton Slimak. [passage omitted]

Foreign Credit Needed for Nuclear Station

LD0501201894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Conditions for partially funding the building of the Mochovce nuclear power station by German capital should be specified this month.

This was stated yesterday [4 January] by Sergey Kozlik, deputy Slovak prime minister for the economy, following his talks with the German Ambassador in Slovakia Heike Zenker.

It is being considered that the overall sum of foreign credits for Mochovce should represent 1.5 billion German marks. This financial help is truly inevitable for Mochovce because, according to our information from this part of Slovakia, if the minimum funds for suppliers' survival are not safeguarded, they will have to suspend all work this month and leave the building site. This stems from the joint statement of two general suppliers of the Mochovce nuclear power station, Hydrostav Bratislava and Skoda Praha, addressed to the Slovak Government at the end of last year.

In this connection, Stanislav Katrinec interviewed Peter Cuntala, deputy head of the Mochovce nuclear power station, and Mojmir Seliga, head of the department for international cooperation.

[Begin recording] [Katrinec] Mr. Cuntala, does the Slovak Power Enterprise, as an investor, possess the minimum funds for both the main suppliers, or are they indeed leaving?

[Cuntala] For the time being, we do not possess them. According to the statement of Director Gejdos, head of Hydrostav in Mochovce, the decision about whether they will remain at the building site will be made after 10 January 1994.

[Katrinec] Mr. Seliga, you have about a week to do something in order to get this money. What are you going to do?

[Seliga] At the beginning I should like to say that the business intention for Mochovce for 1994 has been prepared, but it has not been discussed yet. This is what is important for us. This means that, for the time being, we have no money. To get it, we must undergo important talks at the level of the Slovak Ministry of the Economy and the government.

These talks were preceded by important talks at the Ministry of the Economy before Christmas, which were attended by Mr. Fauve, the head of foreign investments of Electricite de France, where the actual speeding up of the entire process was agreed upon. At the same time, however, I must say that, out of the original three members of the investors' consortium, only one remained—namely, Electricite de France.

[Katrinec] This changes the situation. However, it does not change the basic condition of all of the potential foreign investors, which is privatization. At what stage is it at the Mochovce nuclear power station?

[Seliga] The privatization project has been returned by the government bodies, and one has to wait for its signing so that we might implement the subsequent privatization steps at Mochovce. I should also like to say that Electricite de France remains the only partner to coordinate trade management in Mochovce. Its employees are now moving to the houses of [name indistinct] village.

[Katrinec] Is one to understand that Electricite de France is serious about the investments in Mochovce?

[Seliga] Yes, it may be understood that way because, in mid January, the director general of Electricite de France is coming for crucial talks with the Slovak Government, and our supervisory board has been preparing for them. [end recording]

Party Leaders View Election Chances

AU0401171694 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 28 Dec 93 p 4

[Report by Hajnalka Cseke, Tamas Dobos, Anita Elo, Laszlo Meszleny, Gabor Moricz, Gabriel Oszy-Toth, Lilla Rist, and Noemi Sumegi: "What Results Are Expected at Next Year's Elections?"]

[Text] The big parties generally expect better results in the spring of 1994 than they achieved at the last elections. The small parties and the recently formed ones would be happy to get into Parliament. They are all aware that their self-confidence, and their assertion that a coalition capable of governing cannot be formed without them, can bring extra votes for them. Based on their surveys, the Gallup or the Szonda Ipsos [public opinion poll companies] would probably contest many forecasts. Although who knows.... Many things can change in four or five months in politics, the popularity of certain parties can either increase or decline. After Christmas and before New Year when, leaving the daily political struggle behind, the party leaders have more time to look into the future, this is how they see their and our chances.

Laszlo Kover, parliamentary group leader of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]: We Are Able To Defeat the Socialists

"I would by no means like to express or predict the FIDESZ's chances in percentages. One reason is that I would not like to reduce our chances by talking about them, and the other is that Hungarian domestic political life seems to be very pliable just now. However, in my view, the contest will be between the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the FIDESZ. I hope that we will come out from this as winners. As far as I can see, at the moment, we are the only ones who will be able defeat the socialists.

"It does not seem like a very daring prediction that none of the political factors on the three poles, namely the MSZP on one side, the three parties of the current government coalition on the other, and the "group" of the FIDESZ and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] on the third, will on its own be able to gain absolute majority. Therefore, two out of the three tendencies will—at least partially—work together to form a government majority.

"It does not seem likely that the forces outside Parliament will gain much strength and that any of them will turn into a significant political factor as a result of some landslide-like change. However, in my view, the voting base of the coalition has not continued to decrease for a long time as shown by the results of public opinion polls."

Imre Szekeres, deputy chairman and campaign chief of the MSZP: We Will Be a Significant Force in Political Life

"I first of all want the country to get as far as the elections in order and without major problems.

"It is a decisive factor that all political forces should show more self-moderation in the economy and in politics. Another one is that programs and people, rather than passions, should contend each other at the elections because otherwise we will not be able to do anything with each other or with any kind of election results. Third: I expect a government that will be able to keep this country running and can show some kind of results in the future.

"I think that the MSZP will reach around 25 percent at the elections and will thus remain a significant force in Hungarian political life; we will be able to influence the country's life.

"Looking at it from the end of 1993, it cannot yet be decided who the coalition partners might be. We can only answer this after the elections, and I am not saying this for tactical reasons. First of all, we have to know how much support the various parties have because in a parliamentary democracy, majority has to be shown. In Hungary, we cannot set up a government by coming together and distributing the ministerial and state secretarial positions and then wait and see what happens.

"However, I can now say with whom I cannot foresee governing together: These are the current government parties. I am not saying this for ideological reasons: These parties have governed very unsuccessfully and the citizens will vote for us—if they will—to prevent this government from staying in office."

Zoltan Kiraly, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP]: Getting Into Parliament Is a Realistic Goal for Us

Many people think that, with this historic name, it was difficult for you not to get into Parliament three years ago. At that time, the MSZDP produced a fine example of a failed election campaign. In view of the past three years, how do you see your party's election chances, we asked Zoltan Kiraly.

"The parliamentary parties have a large advantage over us. Except for the last few months, the MSZDP's past three and a half years have been characterized by internal troubles while our rivals left us far behind. While the other parties already have complete lists, we are working on the criteria for selecting candidates. However, the party's 103-year history is a big advantage. All in all, I think that getting into Parliament can be a realistic goal for our party.

"Unfortunately, our party is in a very bad financial situation. Our sympathizers are helping us 'on credit.' We will pay if we get into Parliament. We actually inherited 10 million forints debt and the state support is

very small, we cannot use much of it for the campaign. From the western parties, we can only expect moral and professional support in formulating our program and during the campaign.

"According to the public opinion polls, the MSZP and the FIDESZ have a considerable chance to win the elections. However, we cannot yet know how the votes will reflect the fact that people are turning away from the FIDESZ. The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] will become stronger. The socialists, the FIDESZ, the KDNP, and the SZDSZ will play a determining role in the new Parliament.

"At least eight parties will be present in Parliament. I can see a chance for the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], the smallholders, the Republic Party, and perhaps the Agrarian Federation to get seats. Naturally, I hope that the social democrats will also be there."

Karoly Herenyi, spokesman for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]: No Government Can Be Formed Without the Forum in 1994, Either

MAGYAR NEMZET interviewed Karoly Herenyi on the MDF's election chances in 1994.

"The MDF will continue to play a determining role in Hungarian political life after the 1994 elections. It is impossible to form a government without the MDF. I believe that we will repeat our election results as a percentage proportion, at least as far as the position is concerned, we might not do this as regards the number of mandates.

"We can talk about coalition issues after we know our election results. We can mainly work together with our natural allies, the KDNP and the smallholders party that will hopefully continue to pull itself together, and we hope that it will have much better results than in 1990. Under no circumstances will we enter into a coalition with the SZDSZ or the MSZP. We do not have any contacts with the MIEP and the events of the last weeks confirm that there is decreasing chance for any kind of cooperation with this party. I am thinking of their statements in the days of mourning, including the caption under the photo on the front page of the MAGYAR FORUM on 16 December.

"In my view, the election results will not directly be influenced by the unfortunate death of the former prime minister Jozsef Antall because the MDF will continue his political line in the future, too."

Laszlo Surjan, chairman of the KDNP: Our Candidates Are Examined

The KDNP expects 15 to 25 percent of the votes at the 1994 elections. According to Laszlo Surjan, the KDNP will come up with a more impressive and younger list of candidates compared to 1990. All candidates have to go through a compulsory examination in the party and the list of candidates will only be made public after this. As regards the possible coalitions, Surjan is cautious because at least four parties have the chance to gain 15 to 20 percent of the votes and, in this case, in the interest of governability, compromises have to be made for which cooperation among the four forces might be necessary. It is only the MSZP that cannot be considered as an ally out of the parliamentary parties. Surjan cannot exclude the possibility but does not intend to take away votes from the MDF and he wants to remain especially correct with the MDF. The KDNP expects that, because of the SZDSZ's coming closer to the MSZP, a number of former SZDSZ sympathizers will join the KDNP's voting base. In 1990, the KDNP was unable to set up a list in five counties because of the lack of individual candidates, but it will have candidates in all voting districts in 1994.

While its predecessor, Brankovics's Democratic People's Party, had its main stronghold in the Transdanubia, today the KDNP's biggest membership is in Nograd, Borsod, and Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg counties. The KDNP expects to increase the number of its mandates mainly from northern Hungary. In 1990, the KDNP was not a significant force in Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg county but, as a result of steady organizational work, this is now one of their strongest districts. Many of the individual candidates are leaders and activists of civic organizations, and many of them have experience in local affairs. Sandor Gergely, chairman of the National Federation of Savings Cooperatives; Laszlo Nogradi, leader of the Hungarian Entrepreneurs' Chamber; Istvan Mikola, chairman of the Hospital Federation; and Gabor Jobbagy, one of the leading figures of the Embryo Protection Movement, will run for the KDNP.

Geza Gyimothy, general secretary of Jozsef Torgyan's Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP]: We Feel We Are Strong

Bearing in mind the slogan of "God, Homeland, and Family," the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizens Party with its 60,000 membership is the country's strongest party; therefore, it has a reason to be optimistic about the 1994 elections, Geza Gyimothy told MAGYAR NEMZET. He said that they would run a candidate in all 176 parliamentary electoral districts, and they would mainly like to gain the trust of their compatriots who have Christian and national sentiments. Before the first round, they will not enter into an election alliance with other parties, and they will conduct their election campaign in coordination with the some 20 organizations that are part of the Christian National Unity [Kereszteny Nemzeti Osszefogas].

"We feel that the MDF has lost the trust of the citizens but there is a strata with Christian national sentiments which, four years ago, gave 62 percent of the votes on the parliamentary coalition deputies. We are mainly expecting their votes," Gyimothy said.

According to Gyimothy, they have a realistic chance to get 20 to 25 percent of the votes. The smallholders had 12 percent of the votes at the last elections.

"As our party has become stronger by now, we have reason to hope that we will have better election results in 1994," Gyimothy thought.

Ivan Peto, chairman of the SZDSZ: Even Fewer Mandates Might Be Enough for Victory

"Compared to the 1990 elections, the only change that I expect is that fewer mandates might be enough for an election victory. It is our, just as every other party's, 'obligation' to trust that we, namely the SZDSZ, will come up as winners. I can see a good chance for this.

"It is difficult to answer the question whether the representatives of the conservative, the socialist, or the liberal parties will be able to form a government on their own. However, I do not think it is likely that the liberal parties and their election allies will be able to gain a strong governmental majority."

"As far as I can see, no breakthrough can be expected in the issue of which parties gain a seat in Parliament. As opposed to the smaller organizations, it is the current parliamentary parties that have a chance to get into Parliament again. However, the MSZP will probably have better results at the 1994 elections than it did in 1990."

Janos Palotas, chairman of the Republic Party: We Do Not Ally Ourselves With Extremists

Recently, the Republic Party has significantly decreased the gap between itself and the parliamentary parties. In some 100 of the 176 electoral districts, it would already now be able to have a candidate. They achieved all this in barely one year of organizational work. What does Janos Palotas predict about the results of the 1994 elections?

"In recent times, a relatively stable political image has been formed of the six parliamentary parties. This can be changed by an exceptionally good performance, another 1 or 2 percent can be gained but much more difference cannot be expected. In my estimation, the MSZP will gain the largest proportion of votes, some 22 to 23 percent. The chances of the current government parties are much worse than this.

"It is much harder to predict the chances of the Republic Party, it has many tasks whose good solution can significantly influence the election results. It is a big challenge for us whether we can run in all 176 voting districts. If we manage to achieve this then we can even approach the peaks, otherwise we will gain many fewer votes. Therefore, the election result of the Republic Party can be between 11 to 12 percent or 25 to 27 percent. Whichever becomes reality, we will have to see it as a success because we will be in Parliament. However, our final goal can only be for our party to be a leading force of the future government coalition.

"If we win, the Agrarian Federation, the SZDSZ, FIDESZ, or the KDNP can be our coalition partners. We would not enter into an alliance with the MDF or any extremist political forces, namely the MIEP, the Market Party, or the Workers' Party. The FKGP cannot be taken into consideration because, in our view, politically they are not sufficiently serious. The MSZDP is struggling with similar problems at the moment but it has progressive signs. If we do not win the elections then the program of the leading party will decide whether we can work together with it."

Zoltan Biro, co-chairman of the National Democratic Federation [NDSZ]: We Can Equal the Challenge

The NDSZ would like to occupy the position of national center in the Hungarian political structure. What chances does the party have to achieve this? Zoltan Biro gives the answer.

"As opposed to the parliamentary parties that are also well endowed with financial resources, the NDSZ starts from a disadvantageous position. In spite of this, our position is encouraging because it seems that we will be able to meet the challenge at the elections. I am certain that we will get into Parliament. I hope for a parliamentary position for the NDSZ from which it will indeed be able to have a say in forming Hungarian politics.

"In my view, the unification of the social democrats will not significantly influence our chances. However, I believe that an honest social democratic party will become strong within 10 years in this country; it may become one of the important political forces, and might even be our ally in the future. However, at the moment, there is a big difference between our programs and political directions. The history of Hungary's social democratic parties—including the events of the past years—show that they cannot organize themselves on a national basis to the extent we consider necessary.

"The KDNP and the MSZP will certainly gain strength but this will not be of decisive proportions. After the elections, I would like a coalition in which the center forces that are close to each other—either to the right or to the left—work together. In this coalition, the NDSZ will certainly be among the influential parties. With the Agrarian Federation, for example, we can only work together if the programs and political directions can be well coordinated, and this also applies to other parties. Before the elections, rather than among the parties, we are seeking allies among the civic organizations that have closer links with society."

FIDESZ Leader's Coalition Ideas Viewed

AU0501162994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Jan 94 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "We Do Not Shoot at Clay Pigeons—Party Views on Viktor Orban's Coalition Model"]

[Text] Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], considers a coalition of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Alliance of

Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the FIDESZ, and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] possible after the elections. In Kossuth Radio's Late Evening Chronicle on 2 January, Orban added that, although this is only an "experiment of thoughts" without knowing the number of mandates, it is a politically feasible version. Especially because many factors are pushing events in this direction.

According to Orban, his party would not take part in a coalition that is organized on the basis of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] program, and would not happily participate in one that is guided by the MDF's economic program.

Reacting to Orban's statement that a FIDESZ-MDF-SZDSZ-KDNP big coalition could be established after the 1994 elections, Attila Zsigmond, spokesman for the MDF's parliamentary group, said that many more hypotheses and coalition versions will be mentioned in the coming months. Therefore, until the first round of the elections is over, we need not attribute much significance to this suggestion, either, and he added that "we do not wish to fire at clay pigeons."

As a matter of fact, six weeks ago, MDF Administrative Chairman Sandor Lezsak said that the FIDESZ's anti-church attitude makes it completely unsuitable for the MDF to consider a coalition with it.

"The KDNP will not make any written or verbal agreements or contracts, be it secret or open, with anyone before the elections, and it is too early to talk about events that will come after," Vaszlo Varga, deputy chairman of the KDNP said in reply to our correspondent's question. "We pay special attention to ensuring that the KDNP participates independently in the elections. It is our firm view that we can only decide with whom we enter a coalition after the election results and the programs are known. Any other news to the contrary is a figment of imagination," Varga said.

SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto is rather fed up with the coalition speculations. In his view, some people are constantly opening and closing doors in the rather drafty domestic political life—however, these approaches and alienations cannot really be interpreted until the country is past at least the first round of the elections.

As a matter of fact, the FIDESZ chairman has many times said that, in his view, a liberal bloc would be the optimal solution, which means that he would not be very happy to form a coalition with the MDF. Then he said that they are also open toward the KDNP and the MDF but did not completely rule out cooperation with the MSZP, either—although it is also true that, in the meantime, he warned the SZDSZ that should it join ranks with the possibly victorious socialists after the elections, it would turn into a small MSZP. "When we—or others—would be threatened by turning into a small or big Christian or nationalist party, Orban could not exactly say but I hope that we will be able to avert the lurking danger even without his advice," Peto said.

According to MSZP member Laszlo Kovacs, it is difficult to make out what the FIDESZ chairman is up to. "A few weeks ago when, in an interview with a German newspaper, [then interior minister] Peter Boross did not exclude the possibility of an MDF-FIDESZ coalition, Orban was talking about provocation."

"I believe that a party first has to be successful at the elections, has to win them, and only then is it worth deciding about the coalition partners," Kovacs continued. "In my view, the FIDESZ is doing exactly the opposite. It is probably trying to compensate for its continuously decreasing popularity in recent months by distancing itself from the MSZP."

Kovacs thought it possible that the MSZP might be forced into opposition even if it wins the elections. Should this happen, in his view, it will mean that the parliamentary parties do not accept the will of the electors, namely that the majority would like to see the representatives of the winning party in government.

Party Leader Criticizes Paper's Politics

94CH0155B Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 16 Dec 93 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Competing With the Parties That 'Boast About Being Hungarian'—on Tuesday's Function Organized by the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina"]

[Text] At Tuesday evening's Nyitott Ajto [Open Door] program the audience paid its respects to the memory of Hungarian head of government Jozsef Antall by standing silently for one minute. This was followed by VMDK [Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians—DZVM in Serbo-Croatian] Vice Chairman Karoly Dudas reminiscing about the 1991 meeting of Hungarian head of government Antall and Yugoslav head of government Markovic in Szabadka [Subotica]. Dudas pointed out the great loss Antall's death meant to the Hungarian people, and expressed hope that in the person of head of government-designate Peter Boross, slated to take Antall's place, the Hungarian people would have someone equally supportive of the VMDK endeavors. Thereafter Dr. Csaba Sepsey, the chairman of the VMDK Szabadka organization, reported on the contents of a letter by Andras Agoston to the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] dispatched a few hours after Antall's death. This was followed by a debate over election preparations. On Saturday, the VMDK Board also analyzed the related activities that have taken place thus far. Since the VMDK election campaign concentrates on visiting the various areas, the first visits by people from the Szabadka organization were paid to Hungarian-inhabited villages in the Banat region last week (including Kisorosz, Toba, Torda, Magyarcsernye [Nova Crnja], and Debelyacsan). They were received with great enthusiasm. On this occasion, too, Dr. Csaba Sepsey did not fail to criticize MAGYAR SZO, asserting that its mast head should state "The daily newspaper of the Democratic Reform Party" instead of saying that it is the daily newspaper reflecting the

democratic public opinion. He said this because voters belonging to the VMDK—Hungarian readers—were unable to learn from the newspaper about the 20-25 [as published] VMDK grand meeting last week, but instead could read much more about presentations made by the Vojvodina Democratic Coalition.

"Parties supportive of Great Serb nationalism agree in one respect: Hungarians must be divided. For this reason they nominate Hungarians to winning slots on their slates," Dr. Csaba Sepsey said. Karoly Dudas claimed that the real opponent of the VMDK in the elections is not going to be Milosevic's Socialist Party, but parties and coalitions which profess to be democratic, and which "boast about being Hungarian." At this meeting, too, Dr. Tibor Varady was the subject of repeated criticism; in last year's elections he headed the VDRP's [Democratic Reform Party of Vojvodina] slate.

Press Spokesman on NATO, President's Role

WS0501123094 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0715 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Interview with Andrzej Drzycimski, press spokesman for President Lech Walesa, by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Minister Andrzej Drzycimski—good morning to you.

[Drzycimski] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[Woyciechowski] What is new at the Belvedere?

[Drzycimski] I think it is raining outside.

[Woyciechowski] Yes, that is unusual for this time of year.

The press has been writing a lot for the past few days—actually, for the past few weeks, but, in the past few days, more has been written about it, as it were, and in a more nervous manner—about the issue of appointing deputy ministers in the so-called presidential ministries—that is, the Defense Ministry [MON], the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW], and the Foreign Ministry. The press reports today that Kwasniewski is supposed to meet Pawlak, who will make a decision on whether to appoint the deputy ministers. Meanwhile, press commentaries speak of the president being absolutely opposed to having coalition candidates appointed as deputy ministers. Would you...

[Drzycimski] If I could just make a minor comment here. The president has spoken out on the issue many times already, so let me just remind you of what the president has already said, and he upholds all that: The president is absolutely against making the three ministries political. What does it mean? It means that, as it were ex officio, or that we... [Drzycimski changes thought] It means that we adopt the principle that coalition representatives are included in the three ministries [as heard]—that is, because he says that would lead to absurd situations, even in the current form, where the coalition has just two ingredients. What if we were to have....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] You mean like six or seven more joining in?

[Drzycimski] No, but even if we were to see just two more ingredients joining the coalition. After all, the coalition can possibly widen its scope. So, in that case, we would have in these three ministries, which are key to the state's functioning, at least four, five, six, or even eight....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Mr. Minister, but is that opposition by the president absolute? Is this opposition to the principle or [words indistinct]

[Drzycimski] Yes, it is his opposition to the principle that the coalition kind of automatically introduces....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Introduces their own men? Could one therefore....

[Drzycimski, interrupting] And why is that? It is because those ministries that determine the state's efficient functioning would immediately be made political, and even the most minor type of conflict within the coalition—that has to be said out loud--would immediately have an impact on those ministries that must be of a very stable nature. They have to be characterized by a high level of peacefulness. They have to work for the long term. We cannot have those ministries working for immediate goals only. Our experience so far in these three or four years....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] These are not very good experiences, especially with regard to MON and the MSW.

[Drzycimski] These are not very good experiences, and that is even more reason for the president to.... [pauses] But he also adds immediately what he always says: That does not mean that we are against anyone who is in fact an expert or who has this or that kind of professional expertise or license, or who belongs to this or that kind of [word indistinct]....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Do I understand it correctly? Could one understand what you are saying to mean that the president would not mind having deputy ministers who would just happen to be members of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] or the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], as long as the president approves of their appointments? Is this whole issue about his approval?

[Drzycimski] No, it is not. This is not about the president insisting on approving anyone. The president avoids speaking out on... [Drzycimski changes thought] What he means is the principle itself. He will be supporting the ministries' chiefs in their efforts to maintain the principle. That is because it is a kind of principle that must be clearly defined, or else we will be constantly having a situation of a very unstable process of cabinet formation—that is one issue. Another is that decisions regarding personnel appointments in a ministry are not made by the president but by the individual ministry's chief....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] That is to say the prime minister—I am sorry, I mean the minister—after consulting the prime minister?

[Drzycimski] Exactly. The president just means the principle that he wants to see observed.

[Woyciechowski] Does it mean that the prime minister cannot make that decision on his own without the consent of [word indistinct] minister?

[Drzycimski] In theory, he can appoint a minister, but I do not think that would be an example to be followed. That would rather tend to indicate some kind of tension occurring.

[Woyciechowski] From what we know at this stage, [Defense] Minister Kolodziejczyk threatens in definite terms that he will resign in that situation, but [Internal Affairs] Minister Milczanowski says he could possibly agree. We all know that the post of deputy minister responsible for the Fire Guard is vacant in the MSW.

[Drzycimski] There is also a vacancy in MON, and, as far as I know, Minister Kolodziejczyk is currently looking for the right man, who would like to take up this very important ministry. As far as I can recall, someone there is about to retire, and there will be a vacancy, except that....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But is he looking for a candidate within the PSL and the SLD, or in other places?

[Drzycimski] No, he is just looking for the right man, who would take upon himself issues that are important in terms of being in charge of MON, and that is an open issue.

[Woyciechowski] And what about [Foreign] Minister Olechowski?

[Drzycimski] I am not aware of his making any changes whatsoever. As far as I know, there are more important issues on the agenda right now....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] In a word—NATO?

[Drzycimski] Yes.

[Woyciechowski] What will happen during the NATO summit on Monday [10 January]? Is there any chance whatsoever of NATO changing its position on Poland and of opening itself up more? Could that possibly happen during these next few days?

[Drzycimski] I think anything could happen, even though I am sure some fundamental decisions have already been made. Despite that, there were some measures and statements made by Western and also U.S. politicians. These are proof of efforts being made right now to come up with a [hesitating] safety valve of some kind, for the purpose of possible future solutions. A sudden trip that is scheduled to take place in the next few days by some high-ranking representatives of the U.S. administration is also proof of that, as well as some statements made by German politicians and also the recent visit by [Foreign] Minister Olechowski to Germany. After all, that was the first visit to Germany in the New Year, and it is no accident that the German foreign minister decided to invite Minister Olechowski and not someone else. The purpose was to discuss precisely those issues. The president keeps speaking. Some of his recent statements are very characteristic here. They are quite widely heard. I think that also has an effect in terms of providing information. Too often, we have been examining these issues from the standpoint of: We do not mean anything. But, in fact, we do. Let us not hide ourselves. We are a nation of 40 million people or so. We are a European country of medium size, but we are a very important stabilizing factor in Europe and the kind of factor where the Central European transformations are advanced the furthest and where they resulted in some victories, but also, naturally, in all kinds of slipups. That is unavoidable. Still, we are heading down a path where nobody can accuse us of deviating from the main path even a centimeter—I mean the main path of striving to achieve democracy, to establish democratic structures, and to create a complete basis for a democratic country, and also the fact that we have been trying very persistently to establish a market economy, which, in the long run, creates chances for our becoming a country that is capable of joining Europe's normal economic arrangements—I mean Europe as a whole. And, on that issue, the president has been saying in very outright terms that the views that are being voiced by us from Warsaw are full of anxiety: Let us not allow a repetition of what happened in the not-very- distant past. Let us not forget that....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] The president used very ominous comparisons in his interview for the BBC yesterday when he made analogies to 1939. Is that really the situation now? Is it really dangerous?

[Drzycimski] By the way, the president has spoken out on this many times. Let me remind you of the interviews for LA STAMPA and THE WASHINGTON POST, yesterday's interview for the BBC—I mean, for BBC Television—and also his talks with politicians. It is not an issue that occurred this month; it occurred much earlier than that. That is because he can see that, in the course of this great revolution that was accomplished bloodlessly, we managed to break one of the cruelest systems the human race ever created. It happened without a war and in a way I would describe as outright marvelous. And the Western world, which was incredibly interested in the process, the whole world was watching attentively to what was happening; one could say, metaphorically speaking, that the Berlin Wall was being demolished from both sides: On our side and on the West's side. And then the Wall crumbled. But we failed to create anything new in its place, except one thing: We built a united Germany. But there was no structure or vision of the future created or suggestions made. What is the result of that? There are established what politicians call gray areas or empty fields. So we are now, as it were, between two....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Between a united Germany, on the one hand, and Zhirinovskiy on the other?

[Drzycimski] Not just a united Germany; I would say Europe as a whole, which decided to take a standstill position that is quite comfortable for them, waiting for an outcome of the battle. It is not the case that the battle will result in an outcome all by itself, or that it will be

fought only at a roundtable, at which one can conduct debates. In fact, the battle will be fought through all kinds of choices that will be made and through decisions that the individual nations will make. These decisions can vary a great deal; even the Russian election results are proof of that. And that is why the president says: Let us not repeat the mistake. Moreover, it is also a warning addressed to the West against, through its avoidance of inconvenience, making the same mistake as the politicians of the period between the two World Wars made, as well as during World War II—namely, that they were willing to come to agreement with one another.

[Woyciechowski] In other words, sacrifice Poland, even though it may sound cruel?

[Drzycimski] That is right. This is why the president uses such strong words; it is a warning—a warning that cannot be underestimated. Then no one will be able to tell us that we said nothing and that we withdrew, as it were. I would like to add one more thing: Please note that these words of the president are very easily understood in the West. Now, look at our mass media; we are now talking about it a few days before the event. This is not a problem that arose today. Do we see any serious texts in the Polish press, in the Polish mass media, such as television or the radio, that are concerned with this problem? Everyone, as it were.... [pauses] When the president discusses this, in Poland....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Everyone is silent, whereas the West quotes the president. Mr. Minister, why do you think the West is blocking Poland's access to NATO so strongly? Has the change of the governing coalition affected this in any way? Or perhaps it was the election in Russia and Zhirinovskiy? Or was it something else?

[Drzycimski] No, no. I mean, the Polish elections probably affected this the least. After these few months we can....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] We can see that nothing has changed?

[Drzycimski] The world became convinced that we are still proceeding on this tough road. Incidentally, the president said that there would be no changes in the two [word indistinct]: The road to democracy and the road to a market economy. The rest may be discussed: Should we go more to the right or more to the left? The Polish elections also convinced the West that we are on the right road and that it is a normal process: Sometimes you are closer to this side, sometimes closer to the other side. Of course, we also have our own peculiarities. However, generally, when someone is observing Poland from the outside....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Did, then, the Russian elections and Zhirinovskiy.... [pauses] Did Zhirinovskiy scare the West?

[Drzycimski] No, the West is simply a little selfish. What was achieved in Warsaw during the talks between the two presidents, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa, this famous signature under the declaration of both presidents, whereby Russia stated that it could see no reason that Poland and other countries should not enter NATO.... [pauses] In other words, the artificial hindrance was taken away....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] However, Yeltsin changed his mind later on.

[Drzycimski] Yes, he did. Why did he do that? That is very simple: Would you not do the same if you felt someone's weak spot? Just as in the Leninist rule: Push until you meet some resistance. This is the element that appeared; that is, the West yielded, as it were, and it decided that Russia could submit its conditions. Now, we are asking: To whom is it submitting its conditions? To us? We are not afraid. We realize that, for Russia, Poland is perhaps one of the elements. The West, being richer, is definitely more interesting to Russia. There lies the problem that Russia would have to tackle. Thus, the ball has been thrown not on our ground but on the ground of the West. It is the West and NATO that must answer whether they want it or not. If the West answers that it is ready to listen to Russia's demands, it means that the 16 states that make up NATO accept the dictate that is imposed upon them.

Apart from that, if we are talking about partnership, about the U.S. "Partnership for Peace" project, which is good, interesting, and important, we are prepared to accept it—on one condition, however: on the condition that it is followed by concrete solutions and that it is not a nebula that we are being offered now. This decision must be made independently by the NATO states. The decisions, which also seem to be suggested by statements of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.... [pauses] That this pact realizes the historic moment we have found ourselves in. The future of Europe will be decided here: whether we will strive to recreate the confrontative system or attempt to construct a new, open, and uniting Europe. This is the question: divisions, the bipolar system, a policy of calling up the demons from the past, even the demons of the various -isms that Europe has already gone through, such as Stalinism, Hitlerism—the former, ice-cold Siberian camps, the latter, crematories. These are certain signs that we must not forget.

We can argue whether history repeats itself. I am a historian, and I can tell you that there are certain trends. However, in such moments as the present one, it is a moment that is a warning, a challenge, and it forces us to answer the following question: What Europe do we want to have—a bipolar Europe or a common Europe? We would like a common Europe, a Europe that is open, not characterized by enmity, not against Russia, and interested in the future as the greatest challenge. This is what

we are going to bring up in all of the talks, and what President Walesa will perhaps discuss with President Clinton in Prague.

[Woyciechowski] Do commentators wonder whether President Walesa will receive on Friday [7 January] Ms. Albright, a special envoy of President Clinton, and General Shalikashvili? Will he receive them?

[Drzycimski] If they arrive in Poland, I believe he....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] If they come to Poland, he will receive them. Mr. Minister, can we say now that the most important issue for Poland today, for the next few months or maybe longer, is the issue of Poland's admittance to NATO? Is it a fundamental issue?

[Drzycimski] Well, we must explain a few things fully. We are talking about Poland's admission to NATO. This admission will not be automatic. It will be a certain process. It will consist of certain stages....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] You mean political decisions that....

[Drzycimski, interrupting] Political decisions. I mean a decision that we are in Europe, in Western Europe. This is what we want.

[Woyciechowski] These are fundamental decisions?

[Drzycimski] Yes, these are fundamental decisions.

[Woyciechowski] Let us change the subject for a while. Does President Walesa know the name of his future rival in the presidential elections? Can he guess who it will be?

[Drzycimski] President Walesa has not made the decision yet....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Whether he himself will run?

[Drzycimski] Yes, whether he himself will run. I can say that he does not know the name of a possible candidate because he is not interested in this issue at the moment. He believes that something else is important: If this functioning democratic system starts to defend itself, if it begins to be efficient, then he, as a man of breakthroughs, will complete his mission.

[Woyciechowski] And what will he do? Go fishing?

[Drzycimski] Yes, he will go fishing. However, if it does not function, if there appear smaller or greater inefficiencies.... [pauses] We do not lack only a constitution; we also do not have a fully developed system of the functioning of the state. We have created two poles: the legislative pole and the executive pole. The Small Constitution resolves these problems. However, we still do not have the judiciary pole; this is a basis for every democratic state. Even the latest presidential bill on the Constitutional Tribunal—that is, on the superiority of the tribunal in all decisions.... [pauses] As we know, when both parties were in opposition, the bill was supported by them wholeheartedly. Now that they....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] What do they want?

[Drzycimski] They want to postpone it. There are many such elements. These are the fundamental issues, and this is what the president focuses his attention on: on building a structural system of the state. He wants to resolve the following problem: Are we going to build a state of a parliamentary-cabinet nature, which we have experienced, and the experiences were not always very pleasant? Or are we going to support the idea of stronger executive authorities? The president proposes a presidential-parliamentary system, with full democratic protection mechanisms. This must be clear. The president believes that, in such a difficult moment, a difficult moment of changing the systems, we will need a strong decisionmaking center for a long time. This center must be able to make important decisions—not in a peaceful situation. We must look at constitutional solutions in the following way: If something bad happens, then what? Who will make the decision?

In the past three years, we have already seen a few situations that required some decisions. I would like to see the decisions made in the configuration that we have had so far. I fear that there would have been enormous difficulties. Therefore, Poland is seen as a stable country, in the external sense. Within Poland, we have our own internal misgivings: We want this or that to be better. This is a very good point; it means that we have not stopped. However, Poland is seen as a stable country also because it has a center that makes key decisions for the state. We may argue, discuss, tackle all subjects; however, when a decision needs to be made, we are among those who make it, and we do it courageously.

[Drzycimski] There is always someone, Mr. Minister, who can recall the prime minister and dissolve the parliament?

[Woyciechowski] Well, but I also meant the present situation. I meant the discussion on the future of NATO. It was the president who started this huge debate for Europe, in August of this year [as heard]. It was the president who forced the West to answer the question of what direction we would go in. It is the president who now forces others to answer the following question: What kind of Europe do we want to have—a bipolar Europe or an open Europe? These are the fundamental controversies that perhaps right now seem quite remote and too complicated to an ordinary citizen. However, this also entails another problem: Will foreign capital come to Poland? If we have those political protection mechanisms provided by NATO, we will have the guarantee that capital, new technologies, and cultural goods will come more readily. An entirely new platform would then open up before us. This is the strategy that the president has adopted. It is not a strategy for a year or

two. Some people say that the president is losing popularity. It is not popularity like that of Miss Polonia contests. I apologize to my colleagues who....

[Drzycimski, interrupting] To your colleague, the prime minister's spokesperson?

[Woyciechowski] No, that is not what I meant. I meant those who deal with these problems. Well, now, we do not participate in any contests. The president looks at a strategy that does not include just a year or two; it is a long-term strategy. In those three years that the president has been in office, we could not find any elements that were evident mistakes of the president. Even his greatest adversaries could not say that he violated the law or that he destroyed the state. They are simply not able to say anything like this. They can speak about other matters but not these. This proves that, if President Lech Walesa decides to run for the office of president again, he has some experience, and he can say: This is what I have done. If you want, you can accept me. If you do not want to do that, without any apparent cause, this will be a decision of the people, just like the September elections were a decision of the people. This is the ultimate decision. The president, as a man who builds the rules of democracy, believes that everyone must submit to such a decision, no matter whether he agrees or not. This is a decision made in the elections. I only hope that we will all respect such rules.

[Drzycimski] Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the interview.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much.

U.S., German Policy Viewed Before NATO Talks

WS0501150094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jan 94 p 23

[Article by Sylwester Walczak in New York, Ewa Szymanska in Washington, T.T.S. and Wojciech Pomianowski in Berlin, and Krystyna Grzybowska in Bonn: "Fever Before Summit—USA-NATO-Central Europe"]

[Text]

Will Clinton Manage To Convince Walesa?

Whether President Bill Clinton will score a success during his European trip will depend on whether he manages to convince the leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary about his "Partnership for Peace" proposal—that, according to the Tuesday [4 January] edition of THE NEW YORK TIMES. If he does manage to convince them, everyone will be satisfied; if not, then, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, the U.S. President will find himself in a troublesome situation.

THE WASHINGTON POST also pointed to Walesa's and Havel's skepticism with regard to "Partnership for Peace." "There is nothing good about it," the Polish president said, and he also announced that he will demand security guarantees from NATO within the next six months. THE NEW YORK TIMES pointed to a precondition set by Foreign Minister Olechowski that has to be met before Poland joins "Partnership for Peace": a clear expression of the goal—that is, acceptance by NATO of new members and also of the criteria the candidate countries must meet. According to U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, Olechowski's preconditions will be met. At the same time, U.S. diplomats have been making assurances that "Partnership for Peace" does not mean a "new Yalta."

In the same issue of THE WASHINGTON POST, commentator Jim Hoagland notes that, even though during the Brussels summit the United States should redefine its leadership role with regard to its NATO partners, which was so clear during the Cold War, one should not require that the United States solve European problems, such as the conflict in Bosnia, for example. But, after all, what could one expect from Washington if Marshal Tito himself said that Yugoslavia would fall apart after his death? Richard Cohen writes in an article right next to the previous one. The message from both articles is unanimous: U.S. leadership will never be a cure-all for all of the problems of Europe and the world.

Is the United States turning its back on the Old Continent and heading toward Asia? The administration denies that, while stressing that President Clinton will visit Europe as many as four times this year: during the NATO summit, on the 50th anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy, during the July G-7 summit in Naples, and, in the fall, on the occasion of the summit of the CSCE, which will take place in Hungary. Europe is waiting to see what kind of a vision of its future and of U.S. involvement on the Old Continent Bill Clinton will suggest, Jim Hoagland says at the end.

Meeting in Milwaukee

This coming Thursday, President Bill Clinton will meet Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak Americans in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Members of the White House Security Council scheduled a dinner with so-called leaders of ethnic communities for Wednesday.

The highlight of the Milwaukee events will be the president's speech on the occasion of his European trip. According to White House Spokesperson Dee Dee Myers, Clinton will be trying to convince the American nation about the need for continued active involvement in European security issues.

The "Partnership for Peace" proposal aroused great anxiety among Americans from Central Europe. A flood of phone calls to the White House and letters to the president were initiated as part of a Coalition of Central European Countries, in which appeals are being made to the President to take into account the security requirements of Central European countries. The appeals point to potential dangers stemming from leaving Central Europe in a gray area.

A special phone line was launched in mid-December, through which one can send a telegram to the White House with a ready-made text, in which a postulate is made of accepting Poland as a NATO member. The Polish community availed itself of this modern type of lobbying. It seems that the meeting in Milwaukee is a result of the campaign and also a victory by the Polish ethnic group, which, up to now, was regarded as politically passive.

Walesa: West's Desertion

In an interview with BBC Radio, President Lech Walesa accused Western countries of having left Central Europe to its own fate. He said the West acted in a hesitant manner and rescinded its earlier promises of accepting Central European countries into NATO because Russia had spoken out against it.

"Boris Yeltsin sensed the West's indecision and selfishness, and that is why he set preconditions," the president said. "But he set these preconditions not on Poland at all but on NATO. Meanwhile, the West is acting as if it could not see that at all. What are Western countries afraid of when Russia approves of the principles of pluralism and democracy and wants to establish them?" Lech Walesa asks. "Are they afraid of a vacuum being created? That is not just a simple fear; that is desertion."

Markus Meckel: Need for Binding Commitment

"We need a binding commitment and a time frame for Polish membership in NATO," Markus Meckel told RZECZPOSPOLITA. He is the leader of the Polish group in the Social Democratic Party faction in the German Bundestag and the last foreign minister of the German Democratic Republic.

According to Meckel, the democratic and stable development of the countries of Central and East Europe and their integration into Western organizations—into the European Union and NATO, among others—is in the interest of the West and all of Europe. Meckel said the desire by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to be members of NATO is understandable and logical, especially against the backdrop of the dangers that have recently emerged in Russia. The way the West should respond to the Russian events is to link the countries of Central and East Europe to the West as soon as possible, including in the area of security policy. Meckel also said that fears expressed by Poland and other countries of the region of the vacuum of a buffer zone or even of a "new Yalta" are realistic, while the way the West has been handling Russia is questionable. He thinks that NATO should present Russia with an offer of cooperation, but, at the same time, it should provide security guarantees to countries in Central Europe. Meckel perceives a danger of returning to the division of the world and thinks that the danger can only be eliminated through the West's decisive action, including accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into Western security organizations.

When could that happen? Not as soon as the countries concerned would like to see it, Meckel repeated what Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said during a visit to Bonn by Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski. What does that mean? "If Germans say: 'Not so fast,'" Meckel said, "that means we will need quite some time in which to convince our West European and U.S. friends that integration by Poland and other countries is in our mutual interest and that it will contribute to the stabilization of Europe." According to Meckel, a specific promise or a time frame for Poland and its partners (or an offer of cooperation for Russia) will not be decided at the next NATO summit mainly because of the position adopted by the Americans, but also due to the British position. What is more realistic—and the Germans should insist on accomplishing that—is that an unambiguous declaration will be made that "Partnership for Peace" not only does not exclude Polish, Hungarian, and Czech membership in NATO, but it also constitutes a first and binding step toward integrating these countries.

Nobody Isolates Russia

On Tuesday, which was a day after Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski's visit to Bonn and a few days before the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, an article appeared in DIE WELT entitled "NATO and a New East" and written by three well-known political scientists—Timothy Garton Ash of Oxford University; Michael Mertes, who is an associate of the Chancellor's Office; and Dominique Moisi, deputy director of the Paris-based International Relations Institute and deputy editor in chief of the POLITIQUE ETRANGERE ("Foreign Policy") journal.

The authors express their conviction that, despite the success by the Russian extreme right wing, there are still chances for democratic transformations. This is even more reason for the West to support the democratic camp against the fascist forces. The results of the Russian elections spurred a debate on the efforts of the countries of Central Europe toward integration. There are views that accepting Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary as NATO members could cause a negative response by Russia and, as a result, could lead to a weakening of the pro-Western and democratic front present in Russia.

Ash, Mertes, and Moisi regard these arguments as not very convincing. Russia's uncertain future makes its neighbors' nervousness completely understandable. But could acceptance of the democratic countries of Central Europe be falsely interpreted as designed to isolate Russia? The article says no, on the condition that these countries' membership in NATO will take place at the same time as some efforts aimed at establishing a special "security partnership" with Russia.

The article's authors think that the countries of Central Europe should be offered an "engagement" to NATO, which would open up the prospect of a subsequent marriage. They suggested three stages: During the first

stage, countries of Central Europe would participate in political consultations and in NATO's parliamentary meetings; in the second stage, the countries' Armed Forces would participate in NATO peace missions under the protectorate of the United Nations or the CSCE; and, in the third and final stage, they would receive complete security guarantees in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington treaty. On Tuesday, the German press issued extensive reports on the talks in Bonn between Ministers Olechowski and Kinkel. Particular emphasis was placed on Poland's justified concern over the developments in Russia. The papers cited a statement made by Friedbert Pfluger, a defense expert from Germany's Christian Democratic Union, who demands an associate membership in NATO for countries of Central Europe.

UP's Bugaj Discusses 1994 Budget Bill

WS0501164594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jan 94 p 2

[Interview with UP Sejm Deputy Ryszard Bugaj by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc; place and date not given: "Lack of a Broader Concept"]

[Text] [Lipszyc] After the Sejm speech of Prime Minister Pawlak, you said that the Union of Labor [UP] could not support a budget that is a continuation of its predecessors. Are you going to vote against the bill that has been submitted in the Sejm? If you are, why?

[Bugaj] We have not discussed this yet; however, I believe that we really could not support such a budget. After the prime minister's statement, I said that we would try to work on the budget, to look for a formula that would be acceptable. The version that we received includes some insignificant changes, but they do not correspond to the possibilities offered by the state's finances.

If we believe these estimates, then, for the first time, the drop in the budget's revenues is supposed to be curbed; it is a certain effort to increase those revenues. The only thing is, it is a pity that it is supposed to be done at the cost of middle-class taxpayers. This could have been done differently.

We have three kinds of urgent needs: social expenditures (Minister Leszek Miller speaks about minimum amounts of money that he needs—for example, for social care, which is quite a lot); considerable aid for the restructuring of industry (the budget earmarks proverbial peanuts for that), and the Army because the international situation is quite complex. If we realize what a dramatic situation is caused by these shortages, we should look for the money, even if we were to take controversial measures.

[Lipszyc] If I understood you correctly, you believe that we need several dozen trillion zlotys [Z] more.

[Bugaj] I suppose that it is a sum in the area of Z30-50 trillion.

[Lipszyc] How can the budget receive additional money, and why did neither this government nor its predecessors take advantage of such a possibility?

[Bugaj] I cannot really answer the second part of that question. I think we could have greater revenues from excise taxes; they could yield even more than a dozen trillion zlotys.

[Lipszyc] Some people are surprised that the government predicts fuel price raises that are supposed to be lower than the inflation level. I gather that you are equally surprised.

[Bugaj] I certainly am. The excise also comprises some luxury goods; however, what we must bear in mind is the demand barrier. Nevertheless, in my opinion, we are separated from this barrier by a few trillion zlotys that could be collected. There will be no revolution because of higher vodka and cigarette prices.

Another issue is the maximum VAT [value-added tax] rate. It is quite high, but not the highest. The previous government proposed that VAT rates on energy carriers be raised....

[Lipszyc] And it was rejected by the opposition, including UP.

[Bugaj] And rightly so. What we could consider, however, is the idea of raising the average rate by one point, or even a little less. This would not threaten to fuel inflation; it would charge everyone just a little in this difficult situation. Now, the third issue: We could take some money from well-off citizens for future privatization. It would be some kind of a privatization loan. As a result of this, people would buy fewer imported luxury goods because such an operation would take some of their money away from them.

Another thing that could be done is introducing a small Treasury fee for crossing the border. It would have to be small enough—for example, Z100,000. It could not greatly affect the costs of those who cross the border once a year; however, it would have to be quite a sum for those who cross the border many times, doing things that are not really favorable to Poland.

[Lipszyc] Why, then, did neither the previous authorities nor the present ones reach for those revenues, even though they differ from each other so much?

[Bugaj] I think I am close to the banal conclusion that all of the budgets of the past four years were prepared by Minister Misiag; therefore, what is confined by his imagination also determines the imagination of the government.

I have said enough about revenues. Now let us talk about the size of the deficit. There is one argument of the opponents of a big deficit, and it cannot be underestimated: the problem of the increasing domestic debt. However, to an insignificant extent, we could afford to

do what Leszek Balcerowicz did in 1991—that is, to monetize the deficit, certainly on a much smaller scale.

[Lipszyc] This means the Central Bank printing money. What about the danger of increasing inflation?

[Bugaj] In 1991, the budget deficit increased, whereas inflation decreased. Those who speak about a close correlation between inflation and the deficit in the Polish circumstances must be hard pressed to explain it when they compare these data. This is not such a simple interdependence.

We can afford to slacken financial policy a little bit, keeping our foot on the brake pedal. This is the last moment because there is still a chance to start a simple production increase. It is the last moment because the wealth of enterprises is undergoing decapitalization, and, in two or three years' time, money will have to be invested to increase production.

[Lipszyc] Can the budget, as proposed by the government, be implemented at all?

[Bugaj] I do not feel up to answering this question right now. I warned that last year's budget was underestimated as far as revenues were concerned, and I was right. However, I said that after I checked various data and after some things were explained to me by the finance minister. Now I have some doubts. However, I must find out more about it. For example, what is the chance that investment facilitations will result in a considerable increase in investments, which quasi-popiwek [tax on excessive wage increases] measures the government wants to introduce.

The materials we received take up more than 500 pages; however, the key issues are described only in general terms. For example, what is the government's concept, what is the calculation of the global demand for domestic products?

[Lipszyc] What is this budget like, then? Is it once again the result of compromises and pulling a small blanket in all directions?

[Bugaj] It was prepared not as a result of adopting some kind of an economic policy; it is the result of the demands of the various ministries, which have their needs and fixed expenditures, as well as the result of the efforts of the finance minister, who warded off any attempt to increase expenditures.

The most horrible addition to the budget is the annex on privatization. I have not seen such a nuisance for quite a long time. There is nothing there that can serve as a good argument.

Thus, the budget bill is the result of the lack of a broader concept; it is the effect of looking only at tomorrow, without trying to show what may happen until the end of the year.

[Lipszyc] UP would like to make solid changes in the bill in the Sejm. Is this possible?

[Bugaj] We will propose that individual problems be discussed. If the government agrees, we will be able to do some real work. If it turns out that there is no chance to make any substantial corrections, we should vote against the budget. Let it be the budget of the government and that is that.

[Lipszyc] Can the coalition fall apart because of the budget?

[Bugaj] I do not think so. The coalition realizes that the self-government elections will be held in the spring. Now, the tactics of the deputies of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement lies in the following: Make a lot of noise, but back out at the most important moment. I would like the coalition to crack: If it gets rid of the liberal wing, it will offer a possibility of carrying out a little different policy and of introducing more radical changes. Then we could support the coalition more strongly, which we cannot do now. However, the time for that has not yet come. It must turn out first that the optimism concerning the economic prospects within the policy of continuation is not really justified. hl

Walesa's Approval Rating Falling

AU0501175894 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Jan 94 p 11

[Article by Wielowieyska: "Walesa Straight From the Belweder?"]

[Excerpts] The president wants to expand his authority as much as possible and dreams of a long presidential term. But his grades are falling. According to a survey by Demoskop, only 1 percent of the population views his work as very good. This poor assessment is largely because of his latest moves, such as the business with Major Hodysz [chief of the General Staff, forced by Walesa to resign], his attempt to influence the selection of the new television chief, and the withdrawal of his support for members of the Radio and Television Council, whom he himself once recommended. However, there is no doubt that the Belweder is the left wing's next objective.

Traditionally, the president is self-assured. When he paid a visit to the offices of SZTANDAR MLODYCH, he was asked about Kwasniewski. His reply was: "Kwasniewski is a good and capable politician, but he stands no chance against me. He might become president in seven year's time. Before then, it is not even worth trying."

But one should not be too sure about that. Walesa has lost his greatest trump card. He has ceased to be a capable politician. It seems that things have gone so far that, if Kwasniewski and Walesa were to compete against each other in the next presidential election, the Solidarity electorate would stay at home. A part of it might even vote for Kwasniewski.

According to the latest surveys, from the middle of December, Walesa is only liked by some 25 percent of the population. Only 1 percent consider his work very good. Sixty-three percent consider it bad or very bad. Only 22 percent approve of his work ethic. Sixty percent of the respondents even admitted that they sometimes feel ashamed of their president. Sociologists claim that this negative feeling has exited for many months.

These surveys illustrate the miserable condition of the Belweder camp, whose prestige has fallen even further as a result of the poor election performance of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR]. "There would have to be a miracle for Walesa to win an election now," one moderate right-wing politician told me.

During the time of his greatness, Walesa surrounded himself with people of various political colors. He listened to various opinions and assessments, after which he reached decisions on the basis of a careful examination of the best suggestions. During the presidential campaign, he began to listen to people from only one political category; he began to make use of the ideas of the Center Accord's Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Whatever one might accuse Walesa of during this period, one cannot accuse him of lacking effectiveness. Today, there is no one who could suggest to Walesa some long-term plan of action, no one to create a good image for the office of president, no one to warn Walesa of the consequences of his actions. One can see this deficiency all too clearly.

Three years into Walesa's presidency, what has happened to his widely publicized political concepts, his promises of a new beginning and 100 million zlotys for every Pole, his idea of an EEC-2 and a NATO-2? Nothing but empty words.

Political oratory has dropped to an appalling level. These days, Prime Minister Pawlak is merely repeating Walesa's well-worn cliches about Poland being on the edge of the abyss and like a car with bad brakes.

Walesa himself is behaving as if he has lost touch with reality, seemingly oblivious to the fact that he is being assessed by public opinion just like any other politician. Did anyone tell him that recalling Maj. Hodysz could cost him many votes in the next election?

The president has very few people of his own. The result of this is that one person occupies several posts. Jerzy Milewski occupies no less than three managerial armchairs at the same time—in the Defense Ministry, the National Security Office, and the Presidential Chancellery. This is a violation of the Constitution, but that does not matter to the president. What matters to him is that he has someone from his entourage exactly where he needs him.

Walesa still creates the impression that he discovers for the press what the powers of the president are.

The 11 presidential advisory councils contain a total of several hundred people—"experts." Yet, somehow, the president is reluctant to use their suggestions. He ignored his very own Culture Council when it protested against the appointment of his candidates to the Radio and Television Committee. [passage omitted]

With the passage of time, the ex-Solidarity politicians have lost the flexibility and their ability to overcome their divisions for the sake of the common cause. As a result, the only "certain" competitors in a presidential struggle are Walesa and a strong left-wing candidate, probably Kwasniewski, to whom the presidential post is the logical culmination of his meteoric political career.

Three years into his presidency, Walesa can be sure that no one will deprive him of his place in history. But it looks as if he is finished. He will not be able to effectively oppose a candidate from the left wing. But, will the former Solidarity camp, if it still exists, realize this in good time?

Kwasniewski on Constitution Adoption Process

PM0601101194 Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish 17 Dec 93 p 5

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission, by correspondent Marek Burczyk; place and date not given]

[Text] [Burczyk] We have heard voices denying the authority of the current parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Hanna Suchocka and Olga Krzyzanowska spoke about "unrepresentative" parliament. Jan Lopuszanski has threatened to "organize civil resistance if parliament, which is dominated by the left-wing orientation, attempts to approve a new constitution." What is your opinion on this subject?

[Kwasniewski] I believe that such views represent a serious misunderstanding. In a situation where the current parliament was called into being through a fully democratic election procedure, after the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of that election, it is simply irresponsible to say such things. In any case, attempts to undermine the representative nature of the present parliament are quite senseless. The method used could be applied to question the validity of any parliament: After all, there will always be a side that has lost.... In my opinion, our present parliament, which is fully representative and which was democratically elected not only is perfectly competent to draft and promulgate a new constitution, it also carries a civic duty and a social mandate to carry out that task.

[Burczyk] You sometimes talk about the need to create "a constitution based on a civic compromise." What exactly do you have in mind?

[Kwasniewski] The question of the drafting of a new constitution has been for many years, as it were, the battleground of two opposing concepts. One of these maintains that a constitution should be a more homogenous and politically unequivocal legal act, while the

other concept—created, incidentally, by 19-century thinker Lassalle, who was a social democrat (though that fact should not be held against him)—assumes that a constitution should be based on a social compromise. I am an advocate of the second concept. I believe that the fundamental legal act should reconcile the different beliefs, philosophies, and options preferred by society. This goal cannot, of course, be realized in its entirety, but the creation of a constitution should in any case be conducted through dialogue with, ideally, the widest spectrum of Polish society, through discussion and compromise.

[Burczyk] Representatives of your political group [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, which is a component of the Democratic Left Alliance; Kwasniewski is chairman of both] declare that they will listen even to extraparliamentary opposition's opinion on the projected new constitution at its drafting stage. How do you see such cooperation in practical application, inasmuch as, formally and legally, extraparliamentary opposition is not entitled to have a say in the drafting of the fundamental law?

[Kwasniewski] Well, we have to accept that extraparliamentary opposition operates outside parliamentary channels and that certain consequences follow from that.... Nevertheless, we still maintain that even groups such as that should be presented with individual projects so that their opinions could be obtained. In my opinion, a special forum should be created for that purpose.

[Burczyk] So far, there has been little positive response to your proposals. On the contrary, you can hear critical voices even from the "extraparliamentarians," who do not particularly want to lend their names to something on which in the end they will not have a say in any case. They do not wish to play the role of a fig leaf....

[Kwasniewski] We will not spell out our specific offer to them until our commission has determined the pragmatic framework of our task. So far, we have only outlined our intentions to them, and you can hardly expect anyone to formulate their opinion about someone's unspecified intentions.... I remain moderately optimistic on that question. This is because I believe that sensible extraparliamentary groups will come to appreciate that it is better to be in the know than to be in the dark; better to have some influence on what happens than not to have any at all.

[Burczyk] Minister Drzycimski said recently: "A constitution opens up a new battlefront for the coalition, but the coalition is not interested in such a front." In this way, he indicated, as it were, that he was hoping that the whole process of drafting and introducing the constitution would be actively checked by the government coalition....

[Kwasniewski] As far as I am concerned, I want exactly the opposite kind of action. I am an advocate of quick moves. After four years of improvised democracy, it is high time to create a stable framework for the state's sociopolitical system. I believe that we should include the introduction of a new constitution in the proposed timetable of major political events in Poland scheduled for the immediate future. If the local self-government elections are to take place in the spring of 1994 and the next presidential election is scheduled for the fall of 1995, then, by the end of next year, we should prepare the final draft of the new constitution, and, by the spring of the following year, that fundamental law must be approved by parliament and then confirmed in a referendum.

[Burczyk] Do you share the opinion that, once it has approved the constitution, parliament should be dissolved and a new election should take place?

[Kwasniewski] No, I do not agree with it. This is because I believe that stability is one of the most important elements in Poland's political life today. That is why we have been and still are in favor of carrying out the local self-government elections according to the time schedule, running the presidential election on time, and organizing the parliamentary election according to the proposed timetable. If we succeed in promulgating the new constitution according to our plans—that is, not a constitution of the victorious camp but a constitution of civic compromise—and if we manage to stick to the planned calendar of individual elections, political reality in Poland will have a much better chance of becoming more easily predictable. Is that not an exciting and worthwhile prospect and one that deserves all of our effort?

[Burczyk] As regards the referendum on the proposed constitution, there are two concepts to choose from. According to the first of these, the referendum will approve (or refuse to approve) the constitution after the latter has been accepted by the National Assembly. According to the second concept, the referendum should be held before the passing of the constitution by the National Assembly; in this way, some of the most controversial questions concerning the sociopolitical system could be resolved, as it were, while the constitution is still "on the stocks." Which of these options are you prepared to support?

[Kwasniewski] One thing is beyond question here: The actual text of the constitution should be approved in a general national referendum. As regards the other type of referendum and the question of whether it should have the power of final acceptance or just fragmentary acceptance, the problem is slightly more complex. This solution has its advantages, but it also has serious legal and practical drawbacks. Perhaps it would simplify the resolution of certain questions—such as, for example, the nature of state-church relations, or the extent of social rights safeguarded by the Constitution. On the other hand, what should we do if the referendum turnout turned out to be very low, and the votes were distributed in an unfortunate way, making it hard to interpret them unequivocally as the expression of the will of the people? The concept of a fragmentary-acceptance referendum requires much more careful analysis and consideration.

Ministry Spokesman Views NATO Integration

AU0501123694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] At a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today, spokesman Mircea Geoana announced that the first action of that ministry in 1994 will be the visit to Bucharest, which will begin today, by the first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Ion Cebuc, at the invitation of Ambassador Marcel Dinu, state secretary. Among other things, an exchange of views will also take place in connection with developments in Central and East Europe, the situation in the Dniester region, and the fate of the Ilascu group.

Regarding Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's statements about Romania and the Romanian people, and about other European states—which were termed irresponsible—the Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized that these statements have caused the unanimous reaction of condemnation in the political media and international public opinion.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged with particular interest the statements made by the U.S. representative at the United Nations, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, whereby she emphasizes that the United States rejects the idea of creating demarcation lines in Central and Eastern Europe, and that, as far as the U.S. Administration is concerned, all countries in this area have the same political and strategic interest, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated at the same weekly news conference. He added that Mrs. Albright will pay a visit to Bucharest on 15 January as President Bill Clinton's special envoy. The main purpose of the visit is to brief the authorities in Bucharest on the results of the NATO summit, and specifically on tangible aspects of the partnership-for-peace alternative.

During a meeting with Romania's president, with the Romanian foreign minister, and other figures, the sides will also discuss Romanian-U.S. bilateral relations, the Yugoslav crisis and the effects on the Romanian economy of the sanctions imposed against the Yugoslav Federation, as well as cooperation with the United Nations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman also emphasized that the letters addressed to the U.S. President by Romania's president also present our country's concerns about security. They clearly emphasize Romania's desire for NATO integration, a subject that enjoys the consensus among Romanian political forces.

At the same news conference by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, journalists were informed that the letter from President Ion Iliescu on 24 December 1993 to the heads of state and government of the NATO member countries and the NATO secretary general regarding Romania's desire for integration in the alliance as a member with full rights was positively received by the member states and viewed by the majority of the representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs or of the offices of the heads of state and government as being particularly opportune.

The move by the Romanian president was assessed as being direct, firm, and clear. On receipt of the letter, the representatives of several countries emphasized that they will support Romania in its effort toward integration into NATO and the other Euro-Atlantic structures.

As our reporter, Doina Saiciuc, informs us, this letter from Romania's president was unanimously assessed as an important sign of the absolute priority Romania gives to intensifying its political, economic, and security relations with the Western countries.

Relations With Hungary Discussed

AU0501213494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Today Mircea Geoana, the spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held his weekly news conference. [passage omitted]

Answering a journalist's question, Mr. Geoana referred to certain aspects of Romanian-Hungarian relations:

[Begin Geoana recording] The statement made last week by Gyula Horn is well known. He said—and I am trying to summarize his words—that if the party he is leading wins the general elections that are to be held during this year's spring in Hungary and a government is set up in which Mr. Horn's party held the majority, that would mean a historic turn in relations between Romania and Hungary and, generally, between Hungary and its neighboring countries. We believe that the issue of the relations between Romania and Hungary is an issue of national interest and we believe that the relaunching of those ties is an absolutely vital need for the establishment of a stable situation in this region. We also believe that it is an absolutely necessary precondition for the two countries' integration within Euro-Atlantic structures and that goal is more important than any circumstantial political issue and therefore it should be in the center of attention of any [Hungarian] government, regardless of its political orientation.

I also have to say that the Mr. Horn's statement was received by us with great satisfaction, as it is quite obvious that in the Hungarian political life they have realized the importance of normalizing ties with Romania. We believe that a similar thing is currently happening in Romania as well. [end Geoana recording]

Ethnic Hungarians Form Democratic Platform

AU0501163194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Dec 93 p 3

[Interview with Odon Bitay, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic New Left-Wing Group, by NEPSZABADSAG's Bucharest correspondent; place and date not given: "The RMDSZ's Social Democratic Platform Is Being Formed"]

[Text] According to the reports of Hungarian newspapers in Romania, the Social Democratic New Left-Wing Group has been formed in Kolozsvar [Cluj-Napoca]. Tibor Dane is the chairman, Odon Bitay the deputy chairman, and Karoly Nagy is the secretary of the group that is a new platform of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian], the reports say. NEPSZABADSAG's Bucharest correspondent asked Odon Bitay what the actual goals of the organization are.

[Bitay] The Social Democratic New Left-Wing Group was formed as an internal organization of the RMDSZ at a meeting of counties in Kolozsvar on 18 December 1993. Its establishment was justified by the fact that the general goals of the RMDSZ's program and the groups that have been formed as the RMDSZ's internal platforms ignore the vital issues of workers and wage-earners. We could call ourselves some kind of internal opposition of the RMDSZ as opposed to the sometimes extreme liberal ideas because we are offering an alternative regarding the ways to achieve the economic and social goals. It is our fundamental goal to represent the interest of workers, small entrepreneurs in towns and villages, the emerging agricultural paid laborers, young people, disadvantaged people, and primarily the unemployed and the pensioners, on a political level.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What are the similarities and the differences between the goals of your group and the RMDSZ?

[Bitay] We see the future in establishing a social market economy based on mixed ownership, and we are trying to ensure equal opportunities for wage-earners and manual and intellectual workers—as they are the biggest social group—both in their life chances and in the area of acquisition of property. We support the Union of Hungarian Workers in Romania, the RMDSZ co-organization that since May 1992 has been representing the economic interests of workers. We will support their political ideas so that we can assert the workers' interests in the RMDSZ's leading organizations—mainly the Council of Federal Representatives—and, through the RMDSZ's members present in the two houses of Parliament, in legislation. We clearly laid down our goals in our program that we published in June 1993 in the ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO. However, as the county newspapers and the electronic media kept quiet about us, there was very little reaction to our appearance. The reactions that we did receive were not always positive.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do you think was the reason?

[Bitay] The new left-wing in our group's name might be off-putting for many people. They interpret it as some kind of effort to restore the past. The lack of political culture is the basic reason for this, and the fact that people here are not familiar with the essence of the new left-wing political tendency although this view and ideological trend has gained followers and has been recognized in the West.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What kind of relations does your group have with the RMDSZ?

[Bitay] We adhere to the requirements of the statutes established at the RMDSZ's congress in Brasov. The RMDSZ's leadership was aware of the establishment of this group. We forwarded the statement from our inaugural meeting, our program document, and our statute to the RMDSZ's leadership. We claim our place in the RMDSZ's structure as a new platform.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is the territorial basis of your group?

[Bitay] At the moment, we have local representatives in five counties, namely Harghita, Kovaszna [Covasna], Maros [Mures], Szilagy [Salaj], and Kolozs [Cluj] counties. However, we are only at the very beginning of our organization and we hope that we will also find followers in the other Transylvanian counties where Hungarians are living.

Bakir Izetbegovic Implicated in General's Murder

LD0501134794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1231 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Zagreb, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—A special unit of the Muslim Army commanded by Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija Izetbegovic, is responsible for the murder of Jusuf Juka Prazina, VJESNIK daily of Zagreb writes today. Citing well-informed sources, the Zagreb daily blames the operation on Delta, a five-member Muslim commando unit commanded by Ismet Bajramovic.

According to VJESNIK, three Palestinians and members of a pro-Syrian organization monitored Juka's movements for several weeks. One of them introduced himself as an arms dealer and took Juka to a parking lot near the Liege-Aachen road where he was killed.

"The liquidation of Juka Prazina was financed by the son of Alija Izetbegovic, Bakir, who left Sarajevo six months ago," VJESNIK says in its unsigned article.

According to the Zagreb daily, Bakir Izetbegovic "frequently travels between Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara, using Pakistani and Iraqi passports." It is believed that Bakir Izetbegovic was in Belgium at the time of the assassination.

VJESNIK goes on to say that "Hasan Cengic, responsible for army logistics in the Sarajevo government, was directly involved in the assassination of Juka Prazina."

"Immediately after the assassination, those responsible left for Cairo and Khartoum via Brussels and Paris and Hasan Cengic left for Islamabad using a false Pakistani passport," VJESNIK writes.

Briquemont Gives Reasons for Departure

AU0501161194 Paris AFP in English 1557 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 5 (AFP)—UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander General Francis Briquemont, who is leaving the job earlier than expected, has not been forced out but asked to quit because he is tired, UNPROFOR spokesmen said Wednesday.

The Belgian general's departure "is absolutely not linked with any disciplinary measure," said UNPROFOR's Sarajevo sector spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Guy de Battista.

UNPROFOR spokesman Major Idesbald van Biesebroeck said Briquemont would leave Sarajevo at the end of January. "He is tired. I can understand his feeling of tiredness, because it's quite clear that he is not so young anymore.

"After seven months of this difficult mission he should be tired," he told a press conference.

De Battista added: "General Briquemont's return is happening under normal conditions and at his request," describing as "completely unfounded" rumours about the reasons for Briquemont's departure.

Van Biesebroeck said Briquemont had asked to leave via the normal channels. "He asked his minister of defense, who goes to the minister of foreign affairs who goes to secretary general. It is an ordinary diplomatic procedure," he said.

Belgian Defence Minister Leo Delcroix confirmed on Tuesday that Briquemont was leaving ahead of his mandate, which was due to last until July. Meanwhile the British Defence Ministry said Wednesday that British General Michael Rose will replace Briquemont. Rose is currently British Army chief of staff.

Srpska Army General: Peace Depends on Muslims

LD0501191294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1258 GMT 5 Jan 94

["Pool" item by Vladimir Elez]

[Text] Zvornik, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—The peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina depends only on the Moslem side, said General Milan Gvero, assistant commander of the general staff of the Bosnian Serb Army.

The non-acceptance of peace and agreement on cessation of clashes and territorial division as well as certain open encouragement (from the Moslem leadership) for the continuation of the war are the main characteristics of the Moslem religious-political activities in recent months, Gvero said in a statement to TANJUG.

He also pointed at the fickleness of the Moslem negotiators, the deliberate ambiguity of their stands and their failure to keep their word and observe signed documents.

The assistant commander of the general staff of the Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic, however, assessed that "political realists, which have increasingly more followers, such as Fikret Abdic and individuals in Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo and in other places have started to appear among the Moslems." He added that attempts, mainly unsuccessful, have been made to prevent these people by means of political terror and armed violence.

"Clashes between Moslem formations in different parts of the Moslem-controlled territory are ever more frequent, fierce and on a broader-scale," Gen. Gvero recalled and said "the life of the majority of the Moslems, politically uninterested, is very difficult and rapidly deteriorating."

Precisely due to this fact the Moslem authorities, as Gen. Gvero said, have been attempting to conquer Serb and Croat territories with arms in order to gain political points and calm the ever broader social rebellion.

Speaking about the Moslem propaganda regarding the losses inflicted on Bosnian Serbs, Gen. Gvero said it was

in fact "an attempt to prevent the pronounced erosion of the moral of the Moslem troops and population."

"These propaganda attempts are sufficiently transparent that no one believes in them," he said and added that the Moslems should know to demand "responsibility from those who are plunging them into sure death and further unnecessary suffering while they themselves are getting richer on account of the war and have houses and foreign exchange savings abroad."

"The Moslem people and the forcibly mobilized troops should know that peace could be achieved very quickly," Gen. Gvero said and underscored that "Moslem leaders, who from warm offices thunderously speak of war in which they push others, are guilty if there is no peace."

"It is obviously an attempt to pursue policies and wage war according to religious canons," Gen. Gvero concluded and added that the Army and the leadership of the Bosnian Serb republic were "persistent in the struggle for peace," but that they will "surely and successfully defend Serb territories and interests until peace is achieved."

'Chetniks' Observed Bringing in Reinforcements

AU0601161194

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 6 January carries in its regular 35-minute newscast three reports on fighting in the republic.

The studio announcer reads a report by the 1st Corps information service and says that "the Chetniks unscrupulously continue to shell the city and the defense lines. From their well-known strongholds on the hills surrounding the city, they are pounding Zuc and the Jewish Cemetery with shells of the heaviest caliber. In the course of the day, the enemy infantry attempted to break through our defense lines in the vicinity of the Jewish Cemetery, but they met with the firm resistance of the defenders and retreated to their initial positions. The Chetniks have been observed bringing in reinforcements of manpower and equipment to Grbavica, Lukavica, Nedzarici, and Azici."

Olovo correspondent Velid Djindo reports that "the mortars from (?Bijelis) and (?Silajici) have been joined by howitzers from Kotakov Han, which at the time this report is being filed, around 1408 [1308 GMT], [words indistinct] the defense lines from Krusevo to Musici. In the last few days, the aggressor has been hastily regrouping his forces on the Olovo and Vares fronts. The concentration of enemy forces that began yesterday continued today on the Ajdarovici-Krivajici route. The offensive of the joint aggressors has entered its third month with constant enemy long-range artillery activity against civilian targets and our defenders' positions. The defense lines are stable."

The studio announcer says that "some time after 1100 Galeb enemy planes overflew the Tesanj, Teslic, Maglaj, and Doboj regions, and shelled a part of the Doboj free territory." Doboj correspondent Mirudin Aldobasic says that "owing to this, an air alert was sounded, while all antiaircraft units in the 7-South Operative Group zone of responsibility are on alert."

VSR To 'Prevent' Muslim Helicopter Flights

LD0601124294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1144 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] Bratunac, Zvornik, 6 Jan (TANJUG)—Throughout former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croats have been seeking military assistance from the Serbs, TANJUG learned today from high-ranking circles of the army of the Srpska republic [VSR]. The same sources note that units of the regular Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council have for days been engaged in combat activities against the Serb side, especially in the region of Posavina.

In reference to Muslim-Croat clashes, the same sources insist that the Serb side has not and will not interfere in the months-long fierce clashes between former allies.

The same source also drew attention to an increase in the number of helicopter flights to the Muslim enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica by the so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the existing ban.

As stressed by the Srpska army sources, the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] Command is well aware of this, especially as blue helmet units are deployed in these enclaves. The Serb side has already warned UNPROFOR Command of this but there has been no appropriate reaction.

VSR antiaircraft defense units will therefore in the future take measure to prevent all Muslim helicopter flights contravening the flight ban, the high-ranking VSR sources warned.

Croatian Army Amassing Troops on Borders

AU0501204194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Commentary by Semso Tucakovic]

[Text] Parallel to the talks of our Prime Minister Silajdzic with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic on establishing better relations between the two countries and resolving the problems that had been created by chauvinists like Mate Boban, Jadranko Prlic, Ante Roso, and others, the Croatian Army continues to amass its troops on Bosnia-Herzegovina territory.

Namely, according to reliable information, the republic [of Croatia] has been concentrating major forces in Livno and Ploce these days in order to accomplish Tudjman's platform of a greater Croatia at the expense of our country. According to verified reports, the

Croatian Army brigades from Imotski, Split, Vinkovci, Sibenik, and the notorious Vukovar Brigade are already positioned in Herzegovina and around Gornji Vakuf. We must point out that the sending of fresh Croatian troops to Bosnia coincides with the publicly made threats to our country by numerous individuals from the Croatian state leadership.

First Tudjman threatened that he would send the Army to save the Croats in central Bosnia. Then the aforementioned Granic did the same.

However, the essence of the saber rattling on the Bosnia-Herzegovina borders and the sending of troops to Bosnian gorges has been best explained by Croatian Defense Minister Susak and Croatian Ambassador to the United States Mario Nobilo. For these two, the war of the Croatian Army in Bosnia means defending Croatian ethnic territory and the Croatian state. Drago Krpina, commander of the political section of the Croatian Army, has recently also announced the increased engagement of his formations in central Bosnia. That this is not a mere propaganda trick is proven by the mass mobilization that is already underway in Croatia, with the intention of boosting the troops that are carrying out the aggression against our state.

The movement of the Ustasha formations and their incursion into Bosnia are being carefully monitored by our army, too. Necessary precautions are, of course, being taken that will thwart the realization of the plans of Tudjman and his generals. Our fighters have already acquired abundant experience and inflicted a sufficient number of defeats upon the Ustasha formations to know what to do. They are also a guarantee that the plan of the greater Croatian chauvinists will not be realized and that the forthcoming offensive of the Croatian Army in Bosnia will merely rapidly increase the number of deceased Croatian soldiers who will give their lives for a futile cause.

The international community will not observe Croatia's aggression against a sovereign and internationally recognized state with their arms crossed either. It is perfectly certain that Croatian may soon face economic sanctions, which would mean the situation in which Serbia is right now. The policies of these two neighboring countries have two common traits. They share similar political leaderships and unrealistic desire to submit and divide Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Within this context, one must also view Ganic's waving of an olive branch in Vienna today and yesterday. An olive branch will only make sense if the convoys of Croatian tanks stop tumbling down Bosnian roads.

'Fierce Fighting' Continues in Sarajevo

LD0601094094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0903 GMT 6 Jan 93

[Text] In Sarajevo, fierce fighting continued this morning in the Grbanica district. Heavy fighting is reported round the old Jewish cemetery to the south of the city center. Mortar explosions, heavy artillery shells and tracer fire pounded the area on the Serb-Muslim frontline. According to Sarajevo hospitals, 27 persons were killed and 87 wounded in the fighting in the last few days.

Albanians Reportedly Fighting in Muslim Units

LD0501193894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1335 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Banja Luka, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—According to Serb military sources, more than 2,000 Albanians are engaged in the Muslim army units, fighting in the war against the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Military sources in the Srpska republic say that this is a realistic number based on testimonies given by captured Albanians. A large number of Albanians were engaged by Muslim units via the Raska region after calls issued by the Party of Democratic Action in Novi Pazar and by its leader Sulejman Ugljanin. According to Srpska military circles this operation had two goals: to help their brothers in faith and to gain experience for possible war in Kosovo. [passage omitted]

Army Captures 'Over 100 Members' of Abdic Units

AU0501192394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] On the personal order of Fikret Abdic, his paramilitary formations were supposed to enter (Buzim) on 31 December. To conquer the domineering elevations around this settlement, the paramilitary formations moved into action on 30 December. On that day, early in the morning, the members of the 505th Knightly Brigade penetrated deep into the territory controlled by the paramilitary formations and in the region of (Zboriste), (Cagalica), and (Filarevac) and destroyed the core of Abdic's forces, a statement by the Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army emphasized.

In (Zboriste), the forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army captured the complete command of the [?1st] Brigade of the so-called Peoples' Defense, headed by Mirsad Huskic, and over 100 members of Abdic's army, with all their arms and equipment.

From documents seized, it was evident that Abdic's fighters do not know [words indistinct] that they are poorly informed and that [passage indistinct]. In such a situation Abdic is relying on the officers from Zagreb such as Adnan Dulovic, former colonel [words indistinct], and Albanian [name indistinct], the statement says.

Abdic is trying to compensate for his powerlessness in the military domain by numerous inhumane methods and pressures. He is banning the passage of humanitarian aid convoys to the free parts of Bihac district and

attacking the UN members, the statement by the Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army emphasizes.

Bosnian Army 'Executed' Nine Civilians

LD0501181994 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The ministry of internal affairs of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia said today that a firing squad of the 505th Buzim Brigade of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina army, commanded by Izet Nanic, executed nine civilians in the Stabandza area of Cazin municipality, the Western Bosnian News Agency reports. According to the same source, the fate of several arrested civilians is unknown.

Serbs Give New Name for Foca After 500 Years

AU0501135194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 94 p 5

[B.K. report: "Foca Becomes Srbinje"]

[Excerpt] Foca—After 500 years Foca will soon be changing its name to—Srbinje. This is what the Srpska republic assembly decided at its New Year session, and the decision will come into force when it is published in the SLUZBENI GLASNIK of the Srpska republic. [passage omitted]

Serbs Refuse To Allow Nordic Battalion Tanks

LD0501134894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1305 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—Eleven Leopard tanks which arrived at the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) logistics base in Pancevo over a month ago for the Nordic battalion will not go to the Moslem enclave of Tuzla in northern Bosnia. The tanks will be sent back to Scandinavia by the end of January.

Following the Bosnian Serb authorities' refusal to permit any heavy weaponry passing through their territory, UNPROFOR and the Yugoslav army agreed that the tanks would be returned by rail to a Nordic country—either Denmark, Norway or Sweden, reported the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI on Wednesday.

The Yugoslav committee for cooperation with UNPROFOR said the decision was only to be expected as peace in Bosnia cannot be established with tanks even though some U.N. sources claim the Leopards are not offensive weapons and would only be used for patrolling.

After two months of talks and accusations that Yugoslavia was obstructing passage of the tanks to Tuzla, international factors have finally perceived that they made a political as well as a military mistake, said Yugoslav army sources.

The sources said it was made clear to UNPROFOR representatives that Yugoslavia was forced by international pressure to play host to the Nordic battalion and its 11 Leopard tanks, and that UNPROFOR had no grounds under any U.N. documents to send heavy weapons to Yugoslavia or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

U.N. resolutions and documents state that all moves must be made with "the agreement of all interested parties," which on this occasion was withheld by the Bosnian Serb Republic, wrote VECERNJE NOVOSTI. It added that almost the entire Nordic battalion with over 1,000 troops and 200 vehicles had been transferred from Pancevo to Tuzla.

The U.N. peacekeeper's role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the scene of a fierce civil war for the past 20 months, is primarily to ensure delivery of humanitarian relief to the civilian population. UNPROFOR's mission, however, has been abused on many occasions to supply the Moslem side with arms. Evidence on this exists and has been presented to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

Albright Arrives on Visit, Comments on Conflict

Discusses Croatian Sovereignty

LD0501204594 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, arrived today on a three-day visit to Croatia. Mrs. Albright is the highest ranking U.S. official to visit Croatia so far.

Madeleine Albright's visit to Zagreb is the beginning of her European tour that will take her to 13 countries, mostly those that embarked on the road to democracy as a result of the fall of communism in the East. [passage omitted]

[Begin Albright recording] The conflict in this region has no justification. Aggression cannot be justified. War crimes cannot be justified. Blocking humanitarian aid convoys cannot be justified. It is time to stop the excuses and start making good on many of the unfulfilled promises.

Second, the United States has supported and will continue to support the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. At the same time, the United States will continue to insist on a peaceful, nonmilitary resolution of the problems of Croatia's occupied territories and full respect for the rights and dignity of all citizens of Croatia regardless of national identity. [end recording]

[Announcer] In a brief meeting with the press, the U.S. envoy answered several questions. Among other things, she explained what will be done regarding the incessant Serb attacks on Sarajevo. The United States is aware of what is going on there and is monitoring the situation with concern.

Should the Blue Helmets' role be altered from protecting the peace to imposing peace? The reply was that UN soldiers should continue performing their duties as they have been doing so far. [passage omitted]

After the meeting with reporters, Madeleine Albright and the John Shattuck, assistant human rights adviser to the secretary of state, visited the U.S. military hospital at Pleso where 150 members of the U.S. Air Force are currently working. According to her schedule, the U.S. envoy will visit Vukovar tomorrow.

[Begin Albright recording] It is very important for me as a representative of the United States and as a member of the Security Council to be able to see Vukovar and to be able to see the mass graves there. I think this is something that we are very concerned about and I hope very much that there will be clear access for us. [end recording]

[Announcer] The U.S. envoy is scheduled to be received by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman tomorrow.

Hints at Possibility of Sanctions

LD0501142394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1320 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright said sanctions might be imposed against Croatia if it did not heed warnings to refrain from interfering in the Bosnian civil war.

Albright made the statement on Wednesday when replying to a question on how Washington would react to Croatia rendering military assistance to the Bosnian Croats. Albright underlined that Washington had often discussed the situation in Bosnia and that Croatia would face sanctions if it did not change its stand. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman recently threatened the Moslems that Croatia would openly intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless they stopped their offensive against the Croats.

Erstwhile allies in the war against the Bosnian Serbs, the Croats and Moslems fell to fighting fiercely last spring over territories in central and south-western Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Co-chairman of the Yugoslav Peace Conference Lord Owen said in Vienna on Tuesday it was a public secret that Croatia already has regular troops in Bosnia. This was confirmed by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] reports.

Regular Croatian troops have been involved in the Bosnian civil war since it broke out in April 1992. Their number at the end of last year was estimated at 60,000.

Army Intervention Urged in Central B-H

AU0501122194 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 93 pp 2,3

[Unattributed article: "Unless the Croatian Army Intervenes in central Bosnia, Busovaca, Vitez, and Novi Travnik Will Fall!"]

[Text] The "Bijeli Put" convoy was perhaps the last contact with the Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia, which have been encircled by superior Muslim forces for 260 days. Had there been no testimony by the brave convoy crew members, which have just returned from Nova Bila, the knowledge about the position of about 80,000 encircled Croats would be based on assumptions and the censored information from the Political Department of the Croatian Defense Council, but in this way it was clearly said before the Croatian national audiences that the Croats would inevitably be expelled from the Lasva Valley if the conflict continued. The cooperation of the people with the army and their courage and readiness to make sacrifices are not enough to defend the century-long Croatian existence in central Bosnia.

After the loose cooperation between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims broke, the Muslims made the plan to

control this area, and this plan has been being carried out for months. After the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had occupied Travnik and Bugojno, it became clear that they wanted to encircle the enclaves in central Bosnia. The occupation of Gornji Vakuf, the ousting of the Croatian Defense Council forces from Kakanj, and taking over the control over Fojnica were the three stages in which the ring around Lasva Valley was closed in. These operations made it possible to create a very deep encirclement, which in its narrowest part is 40 km long. If it was not situated in an impassable mountainous region, which restricts the use of military equipment, first of all of armored units, the breaking up of this ring would be much easier. What is more, such a mountainous region is ideal for the organization of defense; it is easy to set ambushes and destroy the enemy's logistics.

The mountains, a bad communication network, and winter conditions are factors that support the Muslim army since they require deployment of infantry forces, which is one of the Muslim advantages. Any intervention by Croatian Defense Council forces with the aim of breaking the ring around the Lasva Valley and reaching the positions of the encircled Croatian units in Vitez would require the deployment of large units that will also have to secure the corridor through which help is transported to Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca. Instead of the expected breaking out of the encirclement toward central Bosnia, the Bijeli Put convoy crew was informed about the horrible truth, which was transmitted neither by the official agency of Herceg-Bosna nor by the Croatian Television correspondents: Gornji Vakuf was occupied by Muslims, and the Croatian Defense Council units were pushed approximately one and a half kilometers toward Prozor, which means that the ring was even tightened. The 6th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was entrusted with the defense of the southern blockade line, which could be broken out by the Croatian Defense Council units from Herzegovina, and the 3d Zenica Corps of the Bosnian Army was entrusted with the destruction of the Croatian forces in Vitez. The blockade of the Croatian Defense Council units along the inner rim of the encirclement is performed by the Bosnian Army units from local villages, whereas the striking force of the Muslim Army is composed of the 352d Mountain Brigade and the 7th Muslim Brigade from Zenica, known for its extremism and the use of Islamic religious symbols.

The 17th Krajina Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, founded in Travnik by the Muslim refugees from the Bosnian Krajina, also belongs to the striking force of the Zenica Corps. This brigade played the decisive role when Travnik was taken over by the Muslims. It is difficult to say how many Muslim soldiers are directly involved in the conflict with the Croats of the Lasva Valley, but independent sources estimate that there are approximately 15,000 Muslims soldiers there. The advantage of the Muslim forces is their considerable maneuverability and the ability to make groups along certain directions. Although Serbian media report on "extensive Muslim offensives," it can be said that the Muslim forces apply in this area the tactics of exhaustion by a long-lasting blockade, accompanied by low-intensity conflicts which might seem local the first sight, but the Croatian Defense Council gradually loses control over its territory. Since time in the present situation works for the Bosnian Army, its commanders adapt the intensity of the attacks to their needs. In this way they have the initiative all the time—they choose the modality, the time, and the place of an attack according to the defense position of the Croatian Defense Council.

Although the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina attacks in all directions, the center of their attacks are two directions in the Lasva Valley. Supported by the Kruscica Mountain, which is parallel with the Lasva River Valley, they launch their attacks at the town of Vitez with the aim of creating a connection with the Muslim forces encircled in Stari Vitez, which would enable them to reach the right bank of the Lasva. Through attacks in the second direction, which extends from Zenica via Vjetranica to Dubravica, they want to cut off the Croatian area between Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca with the aim of reaching the left bank of the Lasva and merging with the southern group of the Bosnian Army units.

According to published but not yet confirmed reports, the Croatian forces have been pushed back to an area not wider than 200 meters at its narrowest point. This means that the Lasva Valley has been practically cut in two. The latest Muslim breakthrough happened after the attack against the Krizanici villages, in which around 60 local Croats were either killed or are missing. The communication between Busovaca in the east and Vitez in the west is now possible only under constant sniper and mortar fire coming from the positions of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Under these unfavorable conditions, including the imbalance of forces and bad weather conditions in an unfavorable area, decisive resistance is offered by the three Vitez brigades of the Croatian Defense Council, whose commander is the famous Tihomir Blaskic. The "Stjepan Tomasevic" brigade from Novi Travnik, the brigade of the "knights," and the "Nikola Subic Zrinski" brigade lost many of their members and are inferior to the aggressor. The proportion of forces regarding the number of soldiers fell from two to one to five to one in favor of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The offensive of the forces loyal to Izetbegovic which started on 18 December even continued during the Geneva and Brussels peace talks. It stopped only on Christmas Day, but was resumed with varying intensity after the holiday.

Apart from central Bosnia, there are conflicts between Croats and Muslims also north of Mostar. There are clashes there for control of Dreznica, a village and a small river of the same name. The Dreznica flows into the Neretva River some 15 km north of Mostar. Lower intensity clashes are reported also from southern positions of the 111th Zepca Brigade of the Croatian Defense

Council. The inhabitants of Usor are lucky that the representatives of the War Presidency of Tesanj, which consists of both Muslims and Croats, declined to carry out the order given by the Sarajevo Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to which the members of the 110th Usor Brigade of the Croatian Defense Council should have been put under the command of the 7th Operative Group of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war alliance and human lives are temporarily preserved.

The encircled 80,000 women, children, old people, some soldiers, the wounded, and the sick in central Bosnia are still exposed to attacks by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although Slobodan Praljak, a movie director and the Croatian Defense Council commander for this area, was replaced by General Roso, a professional soldier, a former commander in the Foreign Legion, but this could have not changed the balance of forces. Even a much more powerful army than the Croatian Defense Council could not occupy the inaccessible mountains of central Bosnia. From the military point of view these positions are untenable in the long run. The civilians can be rescued—by evacuation—only if a cease-fire is reached. An open intervention by the Croatian Army with the aim of liberating the encircled people is quite a possible and practicable solution, in spite of the threats of sanctions, because almost 100,000 human lives have to be rescued!

UN Special Envoy Akashi Visits

Meets With Tudjman

LD0501154594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] We have just received a statement saying that Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman today received Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general and main UNPROFOR coordinator, on his inaugural visit.

Having extended his welcome greetings and best wishes for the successful discharging of the latter's very important duty, the president of our republic expressed pleasure that the UN secretary general himself appointed Akashi, who would help find a solution to end the war in this area using his knowledge and experience.

President Tudjman informed Mr. Akashi about the situation in the UN protected areas and Croatian views towards the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He expressed hope that regarding the Republic of Croatia, temporary cease-fires in UN protected areas would turn into permanent ones. In this connection he said that the Croatian policy was permanently directed towards speedy resolution of the UN protected areas in line with relevant UN resolutions.

As regards the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, he said that further Muslim aggression against Croat enclaves in central Bosnia, where more than 60,000 people are under siege, ought to be halted immediately. Dr. Tudjman also informed Mr. Akashi about talks a Croatian delegation held in Vienna with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. Dr. Tudjman said that he had launched an initiative to meet Alija Izetbegovic and that the meeting would take place in the next few days.

Yakushi Akashi said that he would do everything possible to contribute to the restoration of peace, stability, and happiness in this area. He also thanked President Tudjman and congratulated him on making efforts for the restoration of peace and gave him his assurances that in all negotiations Croatia's interests would be taken into consideration.

Yakushi Akashi was accompanied by General (Viglijk Eide) and General Jean Cot.

Meets With Foreign Minister

LD0601145994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, today received Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's newly appointed special envoy for former Yugoslavia.

Minister Granic informed his guest about the process and results of the talks he had yesterday with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Vienna. He laid particular stress on the importance of an urgent cessation of hostilities between the Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia, an issue on which Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic will have talks in Bonn on Saturday.

After informing his guest about the situation in the occupied areas of Croatia, Minister Granic said Croatia is resolved to achieve a solution for these areas in a peaceful way through negotiations in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. But he also mentioned the decisive responsibility borne by Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic for the present situation in these areas, and stated the readiness of local power-holders to negotiate and reach a peaceful solution to all problems.

Yasushi Akashi pointed out he will do everything possible to implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and that he expects close cooperation with and support from the Croatian authorities in implementing the complex task of the United Nations, and particularly the UN Protection Force, in restoring peace and stability in this area.

Comments on UNPROFOR Cooperation

LD0501222694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Yasuhi Akashi, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] "Croatia is one of the main

parties in this tragic conflict which is the main concern of the United Nations and the international community. We must not forget that Croatia offered its hospitality to the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] command. For us it is important to meet with your leaders, to have their understanding and their support and to make sure that we share common aims and objectives."

[Correspondent] Yasuhi Akashi's statement at the end of the third working day in his capacity as new UNPROFOR envoy was assessed positively. The last meeting Akashi had today—with Hrvoje Sarinic—opened up new prospects for cooperation between Croatia and UNPROFOR.

[Sarinic] "Mr. Akashi is a very experienced politician and UN official. He knows what he is doing and saying and he knows what he wants. He had a great deal of success in his previous assignments, especially the last one in Cambodia, which was a complete success. Apart from that, there were poor communications with the United Nations and I think that the UNPROFOR and its command were very dissatisfied with coordination so far. Mr. Akashi, who is starting his job now, will devote all his time at work and energy to this problem. I also think, as far as this is concerned, that this is a definite improvement on the existing situation."

[Correspondent] The activity of UNPROFOR, i.e. of Yasuhi Akashi and also of the Croatian side, will advance a little at a time, but what comes next, i.e. what is expected, is UNPROFOR's help in reaching an agreement on the end of hostilities here.

[Akashi] "We specifically discussed the problem of the UN protected areas in the southern part of this country, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the humanitarian [word indistinct] and refugees. I am pleased to hear that our stands on all these problems do not differ from Croatia's. To all this let us add a new approach to cooperation between Croatia and the UNPROFOR. All disagreements and complaints will from now on be individually examined to avoid generalization concerning the inefficiency of the UNPROFOR in Croatia."

UNHCR Convoy Prevented From Entering Bosnia

LD0501163194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Excerpt] A UN High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] convoy, which left Metkovic this morning for Zenica and Tuzla, was stopped at the Croatian Defense Council's [HVO] border checkpoint because of its failure to ask for a permit from the mixed commission and to fulfill other conditions required by the protocol on the organization of humanitarian operations, the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna government office for cooperation with the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], the European Union [EU], and international organizations says in its statement.

The convoy was instructed to return to Metkovic because the vehicles arrived at the border checkpoint without the necessary documents required by the regulations and agreements on humanitarian convoys and because the cargo was not checked at the point of departure. [passage omitted]

'No Critical Failings' Found at Nuclear Plant

AU0501175694 Paris AFP in English 1730 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 5 (AFP)—International experts find no "critical failings" at the Krsko nuclear power station in Slovenia, but say it needs to be made safer, environment minister Miha Jazbinsek said on Wednesday.

The government presented reports by three international commissions asked to check out the safety of the plant, and Jazbinsek said they had "found no critical shortcoming that would justify halting the nuclear plant." One of the commissions was from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the second from the International Commission for Independent Safety Analysis, and the third from the European Commission in Brussels (the executive arm of the European Community).

Jazbinsek noted that the reports acknowledged that there were "considerable financial problems" in upgrading the plant's safety.

The power station, 30 kms (19 miles) from the Croatian capital of Zagreb, was built by the U.S. firm Westinghouse and went into operation in 1984. Its capacity is 632 MW, and it sends half of its output to Slovenia and the other half to Croatia.

Slovenia has criticized Croatia for irregular contributions to operating costs and its refusal to store part of the nuclear waste.

As to improved safety, the experts point particularly to fire protection, replacing steam generators, and seismic dangers in the area.

Ministry Reports $304-Million Trade Deficit

AU0501153394 Paris AFP in English 1410 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 5 (AFP)—Slovenia suffered a trade deficit of 304 million dollars for the first 11 months of 1993 due to a sharp drop in exports and a small rise in imports, the Economics Ministry announced on Wednesday.

Exports amounted to 5.5 billion dollars for the period, off 10.9 percent from the same period in 1992, while imports were set at 5.8 billion dollars, up 3.9 percent.

Economic Relations Minister Davorin Kracun said that despite the trade deficit, Slovenia's foreign exchange reserves had increased by around 300 million dollars over the period, to almost 1.5 billion dollars at present.

Federal

Government's Chief Objective: Reduce Inflation

LD0501145894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1118 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Report by Stanislava Medic-Antelj]

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—The chief objective of the Yugoslav government this year is to radically reduce inflation which, owing to the stringent sanctions imposed by the U.N., reached a monthly rate of one million percent last December. The package of economic measures adopted on December 30 envisages a much more restrictive monetary policy, TANJUG learns.

Though the printing presses are operating at top capacity, churning out 1.6 million banknotes a day, the mint cannot meet the demand for cash money. An ever-increasing amount of banknotes is needed to buy an ever-decreasing quantity of goods.

The government aims to substantially cut public spending and procure more revenue from sources such as taxation. Tax benefits will be abolished and payments to employees in kind banned. The average net wage this year is projected at 55 U.S. dollars.

Owing to the rigorous sanctions imposed in late May 1992, the vast majority of Yugoslavs are living below the poverty line and are short of many essentials, including medicines.

A recent survey showed that around 75 percent of industrial facilities have ground to a halt because of the lack of fuel, raw materials and semi-manufactures.

One of the anti-inflationary measures whose implementation will start in the first half of the year is easing the tax burden on the economy by shifting the responsibility for social welfare from companies to the state. In addition, some 300,000 people who are currently on forced leave will lose their jobs and receive unemployment benefits from the state.

The federal government estimates that implementation of these measures will result in a drop in industrial production in the first half of the year, after which it would pick up and record a 6.7 percent growth in the third quarter. The GNP is projected to increase 6 percent.

The government said easing of the sanctions and unblocking of Yugoslavia's assets in foreign banks were preconditions for cutting back the inflation rate.

Late last year, Prime Minister Radoje Kontic addressed a request to this effect to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Store Sales Plunge Amid 'Monetary Chaos'

LD0501200694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1418 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—Sales in Yugoslav stores have plunged steeply as the result of monetary chaos and a dramatic decline in living standards caused by the U.N. sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia in May 1992.

Retailers are finding it increasingly hard to obtain goods as production has virtually ground to a halt. Many of the 70,000 shop assistants in Belgrade go to work out of habit. Downtown supermarkets, once full of domestic and imported delicacies, are now empty of both goods and customers and in many shops the only items offered for sale are a few bottles of mineral water or cans of sardines.

For a majority of Belgrade stores, Wednesday was the ninth consecutive day on which they stayed closed. Because of the runaway inflation, which reached one million percent in December, they are loathe to accept the national currency in payment for their wares. The value of their takings is completely eroded within a matter of hours and is not enough for even a fraction of the stocks they need.

Since cash money is increasingly in short supply, people have to pay for many things with checks. And more and more cashiers in socially-owned as well as private stores are refusing to accept checks or any kind of plastic money. Even farmers at the open-air markets take dinars unwillingly.

For months now, the German mark has been in use as a currency and a basis for formation of prices. Even the value of the mark has declined in Yugoslavia. A liter of milk which sold at 0.25 marks before the new year holiday now costs one German mark, while the average wage amounts to about 10 marks and pensions less than five.

The crisis has led to the disappearance of the middle class. Sociologists say 95 percent of the population is poor, while the remainder is very wealthy, mainly from illegal gains from crime or the black market.

Many economists are surprised that the monetary and financial systems have not caved in completely by now.

The federal government announced implementation of a program to rehabilitate the monetary system and curb hyperinflation for January. However, it underlined that easing of the sanctions and unblocking of Yugoslav assets abroad were prerequisites for the program's success.

Serbia

Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg

LD0501200894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1813 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, received Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, and their aides who arrived in Belgrade this afternoon, it was announced in Belgrade this evening.

On the Serbian side, the meeting was also attended by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic; Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Srpska republic assembly; Srpska Vice President Nikola Koljevic; Srpska Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha; and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic. They exchanged views with Thorvald Stoltenberg, David Owen, and their aides in connection with efforts to achieve a peace agreement for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as about issues linked with creating conditions for the successful outcome of the peace process.

The Serbian side noted that it has fulfilled its part of the obligation toward the European Twelve by securing 33.3 percent of the territory for the Muslim republic and that the European Union is now expected to fulfill its part of the obligation which refers to the lifting of sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The view of the Serbian side is that the remaining issues—which are of lesser importance—can be successfully resolved in the course of further negotiations, the cabinet of the Serbian president announced.

Election of Democratic Party Chairman Viewed

AU0501183994 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Dec 93 p 11

[Interview with Dragoljub Micunovic, leader of the Democratic Party, by Milenko Pesic; place and date not given: "Micunovic: 'I Might Have Achieved a Bigger Success in the Election'"]

[Text] The Democratic Party members do not seem to have the time to celebrate their election success. Immediately after the votes were counted, the passions in the party leadership were stirred up because Zoran Djindjic insisted, also formally, on becoming chairman of the party.

We spoke with Dragoljub Micunovic, who has been the chairman of the party for four years now, about the complex relations and splits within the party and about the announcement of the Democratic Party assembly in which a new party chairman should be elected.

Micunovic pointed out which decisions were taken by the Democratic Party bodies, and what the election procedure should be like according to the bylaws, concluding that the assembly scheduled for the beginning of February can only be extraordinary (its agenda has already been defined) and in no case electoral.

"It is possible that one-third of the delegates fills up the agenda with the procedure by which my resignation from the position of the party chairman would be required. If this requirement is rejected, it is not possible to call for a vote of censure in the party leader until the next regular electoral assembly (in 1994)," Micunovic explained the complicated election procedure.

If it happens that Micunovic, as he says himself, does not obtain the vote of confidence, his duty will be taken over by one of the Democratic Party vice chairmen, and the procedure for the election of a new chairman will start.

I Shall Ask for Fair Play

[Pesic] Will you run for the position of the party chairman if the delegates do not vote for confidence in you as the party chairman?

[Micunovic] No, I shall not run for this position. Why should I run for the position of the party chairman? If the Main Committee in its session on 9 January 1994 opens a discussion on the confidence in the party chairman, I shall try to make the month between this session and the scheduled assembly at the beginning of February a period of democratic fair play. I shall support the principle of equal treatment and insist on the opportunity to visit our communal committees in order to present my platform there and hear critical opinions from our members at the same time.

[Pesic] You deny the impression created in public that your position as party chairman has been weakened by the fact that Djindjic won the election. You stress that "the Democratic Party won the election."

If you had been the bearer of the election lists, would you have achieved the same result?

[Micunovic] Perhaps an even better result, but this is mere speculation. Djindjic also led the Democratic Party campaign in earlier elections. He made decisions now and then about the posters, TV spots, and so forth. I would like to point out that our party campaign was carried out in a very professional way this time and stood out because of its standard. The success of a party cannot, however, be attributed to only one man.

Have you ever heard that if a party has been successful in an election, its chairman is dismissed after that? As far as Djindjic's candidacy is concerned, it is his right according to our bylaws to run for party chairman. Since the candidacy was started in the middle of an election period, it is necessary to respect the procedure defined by the bylaws.

Personalized Race

[Pesic] The impression was created in public that it is quite natural that Djindjic replaces you in the position of the party chairman after the success he achieved in this election.

[Micunovic] This impression was created by the media because Zoran Djindjic carried out two campaigns. One for the party, in which he fought for votes, and the other for himself. The Democratic Party election campaign was personalized. TV spots, posters, badges, cigarette lighters were marked exclusively with Djindjic's name. This resulted in the impression that the Democratic Party is connected only with his name.

I think highly of all of Djindjic's qualities and merits for the achieved election result, but the Democratic Party decided not to be a party characterized by its leader.

I do not want to deny that splits arouse within the Democratic Party because of Djindjic's candidacy for the position of party chairman. I think that it is sensible to make changes only if a party chairman harms his party or destroys its reputation.

[Pesic] How can the present splits, which harm the party, be overcome?

[Micunovic] The decisions taken by the Central Committee have to be respected. One of these decisions is that all Democratic Party bodies must function according to the effective bylaws. Only in this way can we overcome the present polarization.

[Pesic] There is still the impression that you are supported only by a party minority after this election.

[Micunovic] This is something to be measured yet. It is certain that during the election the popularity of Mr. Djindjic rose. The final decision, however, will be taken by the assembly delegates.

I have contacts with the Executive Committee chairman [Djindjic], but our relations are not as normal as they should be. The reason for it is his engagement in the election campaign that was completed only a few days ago.

Compromise in the Interest of the Party

[Pesic] There are people who think that you should have resigned after this election because the Democratic Party achieved poor results in their opinion.

[Micunovic] This would mean that everybody who does not win an election, and no opposition party in Serbia has been successful so far, has to resign. This is a bad comparison with the English Parliament in which there are three parties. Also after this election, the Democratic Party has remained the fourth strongest party, before the Socialist Party, the Radical Party and the DEPOS, and we have no chance of endangering the Socialist Party. We obtained half a million votes this time, and in the previous election for the Federal Parliament we obtained in the coalition with the "Reformers" 460,000 votes.

In the interest of the party I made a compromise and agreed with the proposal that Djindjic bore the election lists. In this way I agreed to sacrifice a part of my prestige and I do not regret my decision. I think that the party will correctly understand my readiness to serve the Democratic Party—I do not want the party to serve me.

The Democratic Party is organized according to democratic standards in order to be an alternative to the communist and socialist party. The Democratic Party has in this way become the model of the democratic political milieu in contrast to the long-lasting authoritarian way of thinking. If the Democratic Party gave up its original political intentions, it would betray most of its members and supporters who joined us because they did not way authoritarian leaders. I believe that the Democratic party will not give up its principles.

Kosovo

Group Urges Return to Normalcy

LD0501162794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1513 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Pristina, Jan 5 (TANJUG)—The Association of Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins for a United Serbia and Yugoslavia on Wednesday called on the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija, especially intellectuals, to raise their voice against extremists and encourage their fellow countrymen to return to normal studies and work and building a common life in this Serbian province.

In a statement to the public, the association warned of "the disastrous results of the policy of extremist Albanian political parties" in Kosovo-Metohija, manifested in the mass quitting of jobs, schools and university. This policy has deprived a whole generation of young Albanians of proper schooling.

On the other hand, leaders of extremist Albanian parties and war profiteers secured a good life for themselves and their children, usurping for themselves the benefits that belong to all in the province. They therefore have no moral right to speak on behalf of all Albanians, said the statement.

The separatist ethnic Albanian leadership, which advocates Kosovo-Metohija's secession from Yugoslavia and joining it to neighboring Albania, exerts constant pressures on its fellow countrymen to disregard the laws of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to leave their jobs and refuse to pay taxes.

Succumbing to these pressures, a majority of ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1990, 1992 and 1993 elections.

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